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ABSTRACT
Marziale, Matthew D. Ph.D., Purdue University, May 2016. Thermal Neutron Anal-
ysis for Improvised Explosive Device Detection. Major Professor: Andrew Hirsch.
In this dissertation, the design of a system to detect improvised explosive devices
is considered. The technique utilized is thermal neutron analysis. In this method,
thermal neutrons are used to interrogate a volume for the presence of nitrogen, which
is used as an indicator of explosive, given its unusual high energy line in the gamma
ray spectrum generated by thermal capture reactions on explosive material. The
performance of the system is then considered for a number of devices used to represent
an improvised explosive device, including a 155 mm shell, an antitank mine, and a air
to surface bomb. The system is shown to be capable of detecting IEDs within between
15.6 and 3800 seconds for HPGe detectors, and within 277 seconds for the best case




From October 7, 2001 through May 31, 2011, improvised explosive devices, or IEDs,
caused 31,625 casualties during military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. This
constitutes 63% of all casualties suffered [1], and thus present a very real threat.
While term improvised explosive device has only recently entered the lexicon of
warfare, the usage of such devices has a long history. Recent examples have included
bombings in Oklahoma City, Bali, London, Moscow, Cairo, and Madrid [2]. Among
the earliest users of IEDs is the Irish Republican Army’s forebearer, the Irish Re-
publican Brotherhood. During the Clerkenwell Outrage of 1867, the IRB placed a
cask of gunpowder against a prison wall in an attempt to free Richard O’Sullivan
Burke, a gunrunner, leaving a sixty foot hole. IEDs also had a presence in World War
II, during which they were employed by anti-Nazi resistance groups and retreating
soldiers [3]. The Vietcong and the North Vietnamese Army also made extensive use
of IEDs during the Vietnam War, often recycling unexploded ordnance (UXO) after
bombing runs [4].
The Irish Republican Army particularly made expansive use of IEDs, having set
more than 10,000 explosions using such devices by 1992, and remain as the world’s
most advanced builders of improvised explosive devices. Many terror groups’ devices
have been influenced by their designs. Their largest bomb, employed at the 1993
Bishopsgate Bombing using ANFO as its charge, had a yield of 1.2 kilotons. Such
a yield is comparable to a small tactical nuclear weapon. They also devised sophis-
ticated command detonation techniques to provide reliable, controllable detonation
of an explosive charge. The techniques devised by the IRA included radio controlled
detonation devices with encoding and decoding of signal pulses to thwart jamming
devices, projectile command detonation in which a device was initiated by the at-
tackers firing at two copper contacts which would close the initiation circuit, and a
2device incorporating a photocell in the initiation circuit which could be triggered by
an individual 100 meters away using a photography flash gun. They also pioneered a
number of anti-handling devices to prevent deactivation of their explosives, the clas-
sical example of which was the mercury tilt switch, which would trigger the explosive
if the bomb was tilted in any way. These techniques continue to be employed by other
terror groups [3].
1.1 Improvised Explosive Device Characteristics
Improvised explosive devices vary greatly in their design; however, they always
contain explosive materials, a triggering mechanism, and a detonator They are typ-
ically used by terrorist groups against soft targets, or against a stronger foe. What
makes these devices so difficult to successfully defeat is the fact that attackers can
often adapt more quickly to new countermeasures than those attacked can develop
and deploy new countermeasures [5]. The most common examples of IEDs in Iraq
and Afghanistan employ one or more 155mm artillery shells, though other forms of
unexploded ordnance such as anti-tank mines and bombs are also employed. The
most common military explosives employed are HMX, PETN, RDX, and TNT [6],
though combination explosives such as Composition A and Composition B are also
used. Devices that do not involve unexploded ordnance often use the improvised
explosives TATP and HMTD, including the devices used in the 2005 London Bomb-
ings [6]. IEDs tend not to exceed more than a few hundred kilograms of explosives,
and have a burial depth of no greater than 60 cm in soil [7].
A typical example of an Iraqi IED can be seen in Fig. 1.1. This device utilizes
munitions from three different countries of origin, and three different explosive fillers.
The devices include, from left to right, two French PR 14 artillery shells, an Italian
VS-2.2 mine, and two Russian OF-26 artillery shells. The French PR 14 shells each
contain 4.4 kg of TNT. The Italian VS-2.2 mine contains 3.8 kg of Composition B,
which is a mixture of 59.5% RDX and 39.4% TNT. The Russian OF-26 artillery shells
3Figure 1.1. An example of a typical IED recovered in Bahgdad. [9]
both have a payload of 3.3 kg of RDX [8]. Dimensions given for the artillery shells
are typical for such munitions. These munitions have their detonators daisy chained
together to allow simultaneous detonation, another common feature of Iraqi IEDs.
1.2 Explosive Characteristics
Explosives are energetic materials which decompose rapidly by producing gases.
The rate at which the explosive undergoes decomposition determines whether that
explosive is a high or low explosive. If the reaction proceeds through the material at
rate equal or less than the speed of sound, the process is referred to as deflagration,
characteristic of low explosives. High explosives undergo detonation, in which the
reaction proceeds through the material at a speed greater than that of sound.
Explosives are further subdivided according to their sensitivity to stimuli such as
heat, spark, and friction. The most sensitive explosives are called primary explosives.
4Typical examples include lead adize, mercury fulminate, and nitroglycerin. The next
most sensitive group of explosives are secondary explosives, such as RDX, PETN, and
TNT, which are much more insensitive to stimuli. They generally will not detonate
without a powerful shock, and so explosive devices generally employ a main charge
of a secondary explosive, and a detonator composed of a small quantity of primary
explosive which is used to initiate the less sensitive main charge.
To maximize the expansion of material during the explosion, and thus produce
the greatest effect, explosives must be dense and include elements to form gases, and
so must include large amounts of carbon, hydrogen, nitrogen, and oxygen. The rapid
decomposition also requires its own source of oxygen to proceed, so all explosives
must contain oxygen. Optimal energy release occurs when there is enough oxygen
that every hydrogen atom forms a water molecule and every carbon atom forms
carbon monoxide [6]. The signature of explosive is thus a dense material (typically 1
– 2 g cm−3) with large amounts of carbon, hydrogen, nitrogen, and oxygen, with the
exception of TATP, a peroxide explosive which contains no nitrogen. Composition
and other characteristics of explosives are given in Table 1.1.
Bulk detection of explosives is then based on the detection of concentrated hy-
drogen, nitrogen, oxygen, and carbon. There are many detection technologies for
explosives. However, the presence of a large amount of parasitic material, soil, sur-
rounding an explosive charge requires a detection method that can penetrate a large
quantity of material and produce a return signal that can also penetrate that same
material when returning to a detection system. Thermal neutron analysis, in which
neutrons impinge upon a material and produce a return signal of prompt gamma rays,
are a natural choice for this application, as both gamma rays which form the signal
and the neutrons which produce them are highly penetrating forms of radiation.
5Explosive Density (TMD) Detonation % TNT %N %O %C %H
(g/cm3) Velocity (mm/µs) Trauzl
PETN 1.76 8.4 174 18 61 19 3
RDX 1.82 8.6 160 38 43 16 3
HMTD 1.6 5.1 60 13 46 34 6
TNT 1.65 6.9 100 19 42 37 2
HMX 1.96 9.1 160 38 43 – –
AN 1.72 (0.8 bulk) 3.7 60 35 60 – –
TNB 1.6 7.45 108 4 14 76 7
TATP 1.2 5.3 88 0 43 49 8
Table 1.1.
Characteristics of select explosives [6, 10]
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72. Problem Approach
Many approaches have been applied to the problem of explosives detection. These
approaches include electromagnetic induction, infrared imaging, electrical impedance
tomography, nuclear quadrupole resonance, x–ray backscatter, electrochemical meth-
ods, the application of trained animals, non linear junction detection, and neutron
interrogation. While many of these methods can be applied to explosives placed near
the soil, only neutron interrogation is useful for detecting explosives placed far from
the soil surface.
2.1 Electromagnetic Induction
Electromagnetic induction is used to identify explosives using the metallic content
of the explosive device. A primary coil is driven with a time varying current, which in
turn induces a current within the metallic object. The object’s current then generates
a varying magnetic flux within a pick up coil, which in turn generates a current in
this coil, which serves as the signal for this detection method.
The primary problem with this approach is the extremely high false positive rate
associated with technique, since this technique signals only the presence of metal,
which is not specific to the presence of explosives. In the case of the detection of
landmines, the EMI technique yields up to 1000 false positives for every mine detected.
This is caused by the presence of metallic scrap within the soil. An additional cause of
these false positives is the presence of ferrite soils, soils which are high in iron content
and so will also trigger an EMI sensor [11]. However, there are advanced applications
of EMI which can reduce this false positive rate.
One such improved system is the U.S. Army’s AN/PSS–12 metal detector. Dis-
crimination was made by exploiting the time dependent response of the metallic
8object. The induced current in the object, and the resulting signal, exhibit an expo-
nential decay which is dependent on the size, shape, conductivity, and permeability
of the object. This decay time can then provide a fingerprint for the buried metal-
lic object and be used to discriminate a target of interest from metallic scrap. A
measurement of this decay time along a loop oriented in only one axis provided poor
discrimination, which was only slightly better than chance. This system was then
modified to allow the response to be measured along 3 axes, which improved results.
The highest achieved probability of detection was only 25% if an acceptable false pos-
itive rate was to be maintained [12], making this system’s performance unacceptable.
Several more systems with advanced detection capability were tested in a large
collaboration under the International Pilot Project for Technology Co-operation. The
systems tested included the Minelab F1A4 CMAC, the Pro–Scan Mark 2 VLF, the
Minelab F1A4 MIM, the Vallon ML 1620C, and the Giat Model F1. The final report
of this collaboration concluded that none of the systems evaluated were capable of
finding all explosives devices during testing, and that moreover none were capable of
detecting all mines down to 10 cm [13]. While in the future more advances may be
made to improve detection probability and reduce false positives, the performance of
current electromagnetic induction devices, especially for deeply buried munitions, is
too poor to be a good candidate for a standalone detector.
2.2 Infrared Imaging
The alteration of the optical and thermal properties caused by the presence of a
buried explosive or the act of burying the object can be used to detect the presence
of a device. Because explosive devices have distinct physical properties in comparison
to soil, they cause changes in the way electromagnetic radiation and heat behave in
the surrounding soil [14]. This can be exploited to establish a means of detection.
92.2.1 Passive Thermal Imaging
One such method is passive thermal detection. Under this method, the ground
is imaged using an IR sensor. Because the thermal properties of an explosive device
are different from those of the surrounding soil, the soil in the vicinity of the device
heats and cools at a different rate than the surrounding soil, leading to temperature
differences in the soil that can then be detected. Because buried objects act as a
barrier to thermal conduction, the soil above a buried object tends to be cooler than
the surrounding soil during the night, and hotter during the day.
However, the contrast between the temperature of the object and the surrounding
soil depends on the time of day. The longer the field is exposed to light, the fewer
objects can be seen on the infrared camera, and so the number of detectable objects
decreases. The greatest contrast between the surrounding soil and the object will
occur during times with great amounts of heat transfer occurring. Since the primary
input of heat into the soil is radiative transfer from the sun, this time is when the
sun just began heating the soil, or stops heating the soil, so the greatest contrast
occurs during sunrise and sunset. Consequently, there are also times when there will
be little contrast between the object and surrounding soil, which will occur when
heat transfer conditions have been steady for some time, so as the day or night
progresses the temperature differential will decrease making detection difficult [15].
Deeply buried objects will also be difficult to find as they will cause less disruption in
heat transfer near the soil surface. Further, surface roughness of the soil can create
temperature differentials which can lead to a false positive detection of an object. To
combat these problems using only passive infrared imaging, multiple scans would be
required at different times of the day [16]. An alternative to rescanning is to instead
provide heating with the system instead of relying on natural conditions to provide
heat.
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2.2.2 Active Thermal Imaging
The active thermal IR imaging approach has been applied in different ways. One
system used 2.45 GHz microwaves at a power of 5 kW. The detection target used in
this study was a large TM–62P3 landmine. Using this technique, detection could be
reliably achieved in 30 seconds [17]. However, the large microwave source required
would prevent this system’s application to a small, portable system.
An alternative approach used high pressure, small diameter water jets heated to 50
degrees Celsius to provide heat to the area of interest. These jets were at pressures of
16 MPa, and were capable of penetrating the soil surface up to 15.2 cm. In areas with
no buried object, a series of dots appears where the jets injected water in to the soil.
When a device is present, however, the surface of the object radiates heat backward
and has a multiplicative effect on the heat appearing at the soil surface, resulting in
an image of the object at the soil surface when imaged in infrared. Unfortunately,
this method requires detection times on the order of minutes [18].
Neither the active nor the passive thermal imaging method are suitable for this
application. The use of the passive method would only allow detection at certain
times of day, and also cannot detect deeply buried explosives. The active thermal
approach does yield better results and could be used at any time, instead of at specific
times, but either the power required to produce detection is too great for a portable
system, or the detection time is too long. Hence, neither method is applicable to a
portable system designed for road clearance.
2.3 Electrical Impedance Tomography (EIT)
In electrical impedance tomography, electrodes are placed on the surface at injec-
tion points which occur in a grid pattern. These measurements can then be used,
along with the Poisson equation for continuously inhomogeneous media and inhomo-
geneous Neumann boundary condition, from which the electrical potential, surface
current density, and impedance can be determined approximately. Buried objects
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result in disturbances in the electrical impedance of the soil, and so a map of the
electrical impedance of the soil can be used to locate buried objects.
To provide the map, low level electrical currents are passed through the electrodes
in to the surrounding soil with which the electrodes are in surface contact. The soil
is stimulated by applying voltages to pairs of electrodes, and the resulting voltages
in remaining pairs of electrodes are measured. These measurements are then used
to solve the boundary value problem, from which a map of conductivity can be ob-
tained [19]. Both metallic and non-metallic then create disturbances in the electrical
conductivity which appear as anomalies in the resulting electrical impedance map.
Detection of anomalies in the soil requires an electrode spacing that is 1.0 – 1.5
electrode spacings deep and at least 2 electrode spacings in size, and under these con-
ditions detection can be reliably made. Moreover, good electrical contact is required
between the surface probes and soil in question. This is difficult to obtain in arid soils
with little moisture, as the water content aids electrical contact between the soil and
probe. However, because moisture aids the EIT process, it can work in moist soils
where methods such as metal detection fail [20]. This technique, as a result of the
requirement that the electrode spacing be on the order of maximum detection depth
and twice the size of the object means that objects buried 60 cm in depth would
have to be 120 cm in size to be detected. This would mean that a 155 mm shell, at
a length of 24 cm, would not be detectable by this system at depth. Moreover, the
system considered in this dissertation is destined for the Middle East, an area which
by nature has arid soils, and so an EIT-based detection system would be a poor choice
for this area of deployment.
2.4 Nuclear Quadrupole Resonance
Unlike previous methods, nuclear quadrupole resonance (NQR) has a significant
advantage over previously discussed methods of explosives detection. Rather than
detecting anomalies in the ground or the presence of metals which may indicate the
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presence of an explosive device, NQR detects the presence of specific elements, and
thus is specific to the detection of the explosive itself, rather than characteristics of
an explosive device. In theory, this should allow a lower false positive rate by not
signalling on metal debris or other anomalies.
The technique itself relies on the splitting of nuclear spin states caused by the
electromagnetic radiation’s interaction with the nuclear charge density within the
material in question. This interaction results in a flipped nuclear spin state, which
then relaxes to the original state when electromagnetic field disappears, resulting in
a signal characteristic of that element. The relaxation time of this spin state is of
particular interest, since it is this time that determines how quickly a measurement
may be repeated to reduce error. Multiple induction pulses may be sent out to reduce
false positives, however the decay of the resultant signal is such that a long delay is
required before the next pulse may be sent. In the case of TNT, this delay may be
up to 30 seconds [21].
Detection largely relies on the existence of 14N, as the other elements typically
found in explosives do not produce a significant NQR signal [22]. This would preclude
detection of peroxide-based explosives such as HMTD which do not contain nitrogen.
More significantly, eddy currents induced in metallic casings of artillery and bombs,
of which IEDs are often made, could create a significant background for the NQR
signal. These casings can also shield the NQR signal altogether.
Most concerning, however, is the fact that most NQR signals, that generated by
14N in particular, are in the range of several hundred kilohertz to several megahertz.
This range is coincident with the AM radio band, which runs from 148.5 kHz to 26.1
MHz [23]. Since both transmitters and jammers along with plans for the same are
readily available, it would be trivial for enemy personnel to completely interfere with
NQR based detection of explosives should the basis of the technology ever be discov-
ered. This, in combination with significant interference caused by the presence of a
metallic casings makes the NQR technique unsuitable for the detection of improvised
explosive devices in a hostile environment.
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2.5 X–Ray Backscatter
At x–ray energies, three interactions are dominant, Rayleigh scattering, Compton
scattering, and the photoelectric effect. For low Z materials, the photoelectric effect
is dominant for energies < 50 keV. Between 60 and 200 keV, Compton scattering
becomes important and backscatter reaches its maximum. Above 200 keV, Compton





where n is a constant between between 3 and 5, depending on the x–ray’s energy.




As a result, density related information can be derived from these interactions, as
Z is directly proportional to electron density, which in turn is directly proportional





mec2 + E [1− cos θ] (2.3)
and a monoenergetic source of x–rays, it is possible to get both density related
information as well as determine the direction from which the scattered x–rays came
using Compton scattering. Low effective Z materials will also have more x–rays
available to Compton scatter, as the absorption probability is strongly Z dependant.
Given that soil has an effective Z of approximately 11 and explosive approximately
7, explosives will preferentially backscatter compared to the soil [24].
However, this method is complicated by metallic explosives. As metals are gen-
erally higher Z materials, the x–rays will preferentially be absorbed by explosive
casings. Additionally, given their relatively low energy, x–rays will be absorbed in
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the soil with increasing depth. This will generally prevent the detection of explosives
at greater burial depths.
Moreover, increasing depth also increases the chance that x–rays that do make
it to the target area may encounter multiple scatters or also be reabsorbed as it
traverses the soil back to the detector, which again will limit the useful signal produced
by deeply buried explosives. For example, the common industrial isotopic source
caesium-137 produces x–rays at 662 keV. At this energy, for world average soil at a
density of 1.4 grams per cubic centimeter, the attenuation coefficient, λ, is 7.041×10−2
cm2
g
















resulting in a mean free path of 7 cm [26]. As the detector and source require and
angled path through the material, detecting explosives at greater depths becomes
all the more problematic. Assuming explosive at 15 cm and a 45 degree angle from
the normal for the source, 21 cm of soil would be traversed. This would result in
the attenuation of 88% of source x–rays before explosive was reached. As lower
energy x–rays than 662 keV are commonly use to make differences due to photoeletric
absorption more prominent, detection depth would be severely limited. Moreover, no
direct measurement of Z can be made using this method, and so no specificity to
explosives is provided by this technique. Given these limitations, x–ray backscatter
is not a good candidate for a standalone detector for buried explosives.
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2.6 Neutron Interrogation
Neutron interrogation falls into two general categories, fast neutron analysis (FNA)
and thermal neutron analysis (TNA), or some combination of the two techniques as
in pulsed fast neutron analysis (PFNA) or a refinement thereof such as the associated
particle technique. These two techniques rely on two different types of reactions.
Fast neutron analysis uses inelastic scattering events while thermal neutron analysis
relies on thermal neutron capture. Both of these interactions produce gamma rays
characteristic of the element with which the neutron interacted, which can in turn be
used to identify a material using the spectrum produced.
Neutron interrogation has the advantage, along with nuclear quadrupole reso-
nance, of providing a signal that is specific to the chemistry of the target interrogated,
and not features of explosives such as the presence of metal or electronics, allowing
for a reduction of false positives from debris. Further, since neutrons carry no charge,
they are weakly interacting with common materials, allowing for significant penetra-
tion in common materials, thus allowing for non-destructive interrogation at greater
depths than most other techniques.
Both techniques rely on the detection of elements contained by explosives, most
commonly hydrogen, nitrogen, oxygen, and carbon. These elements produce spec-
tra which are characteristic of each element. The detection of one of the elements
singularly or a combination of the elements, especially in certain relative ratios, can
then signal the presence of explosive in the environment. The presence of particu-
lar ratios of elements is of interest because explosives have characteristic ratios of
these elements, since optimal energy release occurs when there is enough oxygen that
every hydrogen atom forms a water molecule and every carbon atom forms carbon
monoxide [6].
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Inelastic scatter threshold energies for important constituants of soil [27]
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2.6.1 Fast neutron analysis (FNA)
Fast neutron analysis is based on inelastic scattering of fast neutrons (neutrons
having kinetic energies exceeding 0.1 MeV) off of nuclei in the target material. In this
process, a fast neutron collides with a neutron, scattering off in a different direction
with reduced energy. The energy lost excites the target nucleus resulting in an excited
nuclear state, which then decays, releasing one or more gamma rays with energies
dictated by selection rules. The emitted gamma rays have energies characteristic
of each nucleus, and so a spectrum of energies of gamma rays results from neutron
interrogation of a target material composed of one or more elements. Lines in the
resulting spectrum can then be used to identify the composition of the target material.
To examine the feasibility of this method, the constituents of explosives and their
respective lines must be examined. From the discussion in the previous chapter,
these include hydrogen, carbon, oxygen and nitrogen. The lines produced by inelastic
scatter for these elements are the 4.44 MeV line for carbon, 6.13 MeV for oxygen,
and 2.31 MeV for nitrogen. Hydrogen does not produce an inelastic scatter line [28].
While fast neutron analysis has been used successfully in the field of luggage screening
and other related fields, IED detection presents a substantial challenge which the
screening of luggage does not, the presence of a large quantity of parasitic material,
namely the soil, that provides significant interference with the inelastic scattering
lines which form the basis of fast neutron analysis.
This is particularly true in the case of oxygen. World average soil contains 48.87%
oxygen by mass [29], making the possibility distinguishing the presence of oxygen from
explosive from background oxygen unlikely. The presence of oxygen also presents a
problem for the use of carbon and its characteristic 4.44 MeV inelastic scatter line.
Instead of inelastic scattering, oxygen may also participate in a 16O(n, α) reaction,
leaving an excited 12C nucleus, which may then decay by releasing a 4.44 MeV gamma,
as in an inelastic scattering reaction. This effect is strong enough to completely mask
the presence of carbon from an explosive [30]. As a result of the natural abundance
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of oxygen in soil, neither oxygen nor carbon lines provide of useful signature for the
presence of explosive.
The only remaining candidate element for use with fast neutron analysis is then
nitrogen. Unfortunately, the nitrogen line occurs very close to the thermal neutron
line produced by hydrogen, which will provide a strong source of interference given the
presence of hydrogen in the soil at an average percentage by number of 25%. Nitrogen
also produces another strong line at 5.31 MeV without any significant background
interference from soil, however the cross section of 42.4 mb is 43.4% smaller than the
75 mb thermal capture cross section of 14N [31]. Moreover, as the neutrons produced
by the generator traverse the soil, they may participate in a number of reactions which
will result in a loss of energy. As a result as neutrons penetrate deeper and deeper
in to the soil, their average energy will decrease, leaving fewer and fewer neutrons
available to participate in an inelastic scatter with nitrogen. Neutron capture, the
reaction that serves as the basis of thermal neutron analysis, by contrast, will become
more likely with decreasing energy and has a larger cross section. Hence, for the
identification of explosives within soil, thermal neutron analysis is the better choice.
2.6.2 Thermal neutron analysis (TNA)
Thermal neutron analysis is based on thermal capture of neutrons by target nu-
clei, which produces an excited state which then decays by emission of gamma rays
characteristic of the element with which the neutron reacts. As with fast neutron
analysis, the elements of interest for the detection of explosives are oxygen, hydrogen,
nitrogen, and carbon. As before, neither hydrogen nor oxygen’s lines can serve as an
indicator of explosive, as soil contains a high percentage of either element, leaving
nitrogen and carbon as the only elements of interest for the detection of explosives in
soil.
As with fast neutron analysis, however, carbon is not useful for the detection of
explosives. The two natural isotopes of carbon, 12C and 13C, both have small thermal
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capture cross sections of 0.34 mb and 0.14 mb, respectively [31]. The three strong lines
produced by 12C occur at 1.261 MeV, 3.683 MeV, and 4.945 MeV. The 1.261 MeV line
is not useful because it is quite close to a line produced by 29Si at 1.263 MeV. The line
at 3.683 MeV has no significant naturally occurring background from any particular
element, however this energy is within the range where Compton scattering is the
dominant energy loss mechanism of gamma rays within the detector material, which
results in a strong continuum background. Given 12C’s small capture cross section
and the large background produced by Compton scattering, this line is of limited use
for explosives detection. The 4.945 MeV line does have a background at 4.933 MeV
produced by 28Si. The only strong line produced by 13C occurs at 8.174 MeV. While
this line does not have any significant background, the isotopic abundance of 13C is
quite low at 1.07%. Given the combination of a low isotopic abundance and a small
capture cross section, the 8.174 MeV line produced by carbon-13 will also be unlikely
to serve as a useful indicator of the presence of explosive [32].
The remaining element of interest is then nitrogen, which has two stable isotopes,
14N and 15N, though the isotopic abundance of 15N is small at 0.364%, and further has
a small capture cross section of 0.00241 mb, and so is not of interest as an explosive
signature. Nitrogen-14, however, has a capture cross section of 75 mb which produces
its strongest lines at 1.884 MeV, 3.677 MeV, 4.508 MeV, 5.269 MeV, 6.322 MeV, and
10.829 MeV [32]. None of these lines have significant sources of background, outside
of the Compton continuum, which is often a considerable source. However, the 10.829
MeV line is within the range of energies where the Compton continuum is small as a
result of pair production being the dominant energy loss mechanism for gamma rays
of that energy and further has the advantage of being the most energetic gamma ray
produced by thermal capture on naturally occuring elements. The only significant
background is the relatively weak 10.6 MeV line produced by 29Si, which only has an
isotopic abundance of 4.685% and a capture cross section of 120 mb. The 10.8 MeV
line is thus preferable to the other lines produced by nitrogen as it should have a low
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background compared to the other lines which fall within the Compton continuum
and will serve as the basis of the detection of explosives.
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3. Introduction to MCNP5
MCNP5 will be used to simulate the ground, explosives, and detectors to determine
the efficacy of the designed system. MCNP uses the Monte Carlo method to simulate
the transport of neutrons, electrons, and photons. The program can be set up to
transport either each type of radiation by itself, or any combination of 2 or more of
the possible types [33].
3.1 The Monte Carlo Method
The Monte Carlo technique uses repeated random sampling to compute some
result. One historical example of an application of the Monte Carlo technique involves
a technique proposed by George-Louis Leclerc and Comte de Buffon to estimate the
value of pi. The method employed involved dropping sticks of known length on to
a plane surface on which parallel lines had been arranged such that the lines were
spaced a distance equal or greater than the length of the sticks. The probability a





By repeatedly dropping sticks on the plane, an estimate of Pcut can be obtained, since






where N is the number of trials which result in the event, and Nt is the total number
of trials. If nc is the number of trials in which the stick lands on one of the line





This estimation of the probability can then be used to estimate the value of pi by








The statistical process of dropping stick is thus used to obtain an estimate of the
value of pi [34].
3.1.1 Particle Transport
The transport process of neutral particles such as gamma rays and neutrons is
likewise a statistical process which can be estimated using Monte Carlo techniques.





where σT,j is the total cross section of the jth atomic species of the material and ρj
its density, the probability of interaction for 0 ≤ x ≤ ∞ is given by
f (x) = ΣT e
−ΣT x (3.6)
and the probability of having interacted after a distance x is
F (x) = 1− e−ΣT x (3.7)
the distance travelled before interaction can then be sampled by using a random
number, ξ, and solving for the distance travelled, x
x = − ln (1− ξ)
ΣT
(3.8)
by repeatedly sampling x, the average distance travelled and other quantities can
then be estimated.
In addition to travelled distance, colliding isotope is also important for transport.






As these are discrete values, a table lookup is used to sample these. A random number










Given the selected isotope, the reaction on that isotope must be selected among
















is such for a randomly generated number ξ, Pj−1 ≤ ξ ≤ Pj. Once this is completed,
the outgoing energy and direction must be computed. The method of doing this is
reaction type dependant [35].
MCNP and Histories
For each particle generated by the source, MCNP follows the above method, track-
ing the movement of the particle in what is called a history. Cells are defined using
conical mathematically defined surfaces. As each particle traverses the problem space,
a determination is made if an interaction occurs within the current cell by calculating
the distance to the exit point in the cell. If an interaction is not made within the
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remaining distance travelled through the cell, then that particle does not interact
with the current cell and instead moves in to the next cell.
In the next cell the process is repeated. If the particle does interact, its new energy
and direction are computed and the process repeats again. If secondary particles are
generated, they are tracked through the problem space with their own history. The
history of the particle is terminated when the particle is absorbed, or when the particle
enters a cell with an importance set to zero for that particular particle type. Cells of
zero importance mark the extent of the problem space.
This process is repeated, typically for a defined number of particles, and then the
run is terminated [36].
3.1.2 MCNP Problem Definition
Simulations are entered in to MCNP using what are referred to as decks. These
decks include cell, surface, and data cards.Cells define the problem’s volume. For
example, the interior of a sphere of 100 cm radius may be chosen to be a cell within the
simulation. These cells are defined by the surface cards, which consist of mnemonics
for various surface equations, such as PZ1 for a plane defined by z = 1. By combining
these surfaces and indicating the sense of the surface for a given cell, cells may be
defined using the surfaces entered in the deck.
The data card then define the other information about the problem. Examples of
the data cards include the source definition card. This card defines the source particle
type as well as its distribution. The default is a point source at coordinates which
are set by the user in this card. The importances of cells are also defined within the
data cards, which determine how particle transport will proceed, or if transport will
terminate all together in the case that the cell importance is zero.
Tallies are also defined by the data cards. Tallies are what is used to generate
physically meaningful data, such as a surface flux. These cards define parameters
of the tally, such as for the surface flux what surface the flux is to be collected on.
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Tallies can also be binned. The most common bin would be an energy bin so that
energy spectrum associated with a given particle can be seen on a defined surface.
Cosine bins can also be used to split the flux in to angular information, such as
counting only particles moving upward. Tallies, with the exception of the F8 energy
deposition tally, can also be binned by time. This allows the flux to be split up in the
time domain, and used to account for things such as a detector being gated off [36].
3.1.3 MCNP Limitations
While a respected and time tested software package, MCNP5 does have limi-
tations. In terms of the simulations required, the most significant of these is the
inability to perform an F8 energy deposition tally, normally used to simulate detector
response, with time binning. The use of pulsed mode operation, that is gating off the
detectors during a neutron pulse followed by a period without neutron production
with the detectors gated on, would require time binning during an F8 tally for the
most accurate representation of the detectors’ response.
However, as this is an impossibility, an alternate simulation technique was devel-
oped wherein a surface tally was taken with time bins in place over the surfaces of
the detector array. A series of simulations was then conducted with a pure gamma
ray source of energies between 0 and 11 MeV were placed in varying positions and
angles of incidence on the detector surface. The results, with energy broadening ap-
plied, were averaged across these positions and locations at each bin energy from the
primary simulation. This allowed an estimate of the signal after time binning was
applied.
A second major limitation is the inability to account for the background produced
by the radioisotope 128I which is produced as a result of the capture of neutrons on 127I.
This would require knowing the energy captured as the 6.8 MeV photons produced
by decay traverse the detectors during the period in which the detectors are gated
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on, which would again require an F8 tally with time binning, which is unsupported
in MCNP5.
The final significant limitation is that of available soil data. There is little detailed
elemental analysis of soil available for different regions, and so accounting for potential
variation caused by regional soil variation is difficult absent this data.
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4. Source Selection
4.1 Types of Neutron Sources
The two types of sources include radioisotopic sources, such as Cf-252, which pro-
duce neutrons through the spontaneous fission, sources based on the (α, n) reaction,




Californium-252 decays both by spontaneous fission (3.09% probability) and alpha
emission (96.91% probability) with a half life of 2.645 years. Its neutron emission rate
is 2.314×106 s−1 µg and a specific activity of 0.536 mCi µg. 252Cf does not produce






which yields an average energy of 2.1 MeV and a most probable energy of 0.7 MeV [37].
The density of 252Cf is 15.1 g cm−3. To obtain a neutron production rate of 3×108
s−1, a rate comparable to typical DT fusion sources, a volume of only 8.6×10−6 cm3
of californium would be required, allowing for a very compact source. The cost of
these sources is $60 per microgram, meaning that to obtain a neutron production
rate comparable to that of available DT fusion sources, 129 µg would be required at
a cost of $7,800 [37], so a 252Cf source would also be a low cost, compact, and low
maintenance option. However, since the source is based on spontaneous fission, it
may not be deactivated, and so would require bulky shielding, present a radiation
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safety hazard, and prevent pulsing of the source to reduce the background of the
thermal capture lines of interest. Further, 252Cf also produces 8 gamma rays for
every 4 neutrons produced, and so would also present a considerable increase in the
gamma ray background [38,39].
4.1.2 Fusion Sources
In fusion sources, deuterons are accelerated to an energy sufficient to overcome
the Coulomb barrier and strike a target containing light nuclei, typical deuterons
or tritons. The fusion reactions that result produce neutrons as a product of the
reaction. The two major types of commercially available neutron generators utilize
DD and DT fusion reactions. These sources utilize a linear accelerator to accelerate
a beam of particles through a potential of 100 keV. The particles then strike a metal
hydride target which has been loaded with tritium and deuterium, in the case of a DD
generator, or deuterium in the case of a DD generator. The DD reactions produces a
2.5 MeV neutron while that of the DT generator produces a 14.1 MeV neutron.
These types of sources provide the advantage that they can be turned on and off
by activating and deactivating the beam of incoming particles. As a result, they do
not present a safety threat when not in use, and more importantly can be used in
a pulsed mode. Pulsed mode operation allows the collection of gamma ray spectra
in the detectors during the generator’s off cycle. This can allow fast neutrons to die
away so that the spectra being collected are predominately thermal neutron reactions.
As a result, the background to the signal can be significantly reduced in the case of
thermal neutron reactions, as radiative inelastic scatter reactions no longer contribute
to the spectrum, thus reducing the background considerably.
4.1.3 Source Type Selection
Given the selection of thermal neutron analysis, the neutron source then had to be
selected. The types of sources considered include a 252Cf radioisotopic source, a DD
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fusion-based source, and a DT fusion–based source. Ultimately, a DT neutron gener-
ator was selected because of safety and physics considerations that will be discussed
later.
Radioisotopic sources were rejected because it is not possible to deactivate these
sources since they produce neutrons using spontaneous fission. Because of this short-
coming, these sources may not be pulsed, and so a significantly higher signal to noise
ratio results from their use. Furthermore, since this system is destined for use around
civilians and for use by those with little or no radiation safety training, it is preferable
to have a source that can be turned off to limit incidental exposure.
4.2 Source Optimization
Of the two remaining candidates, generators based on DD or DT fusion, MCNP
and practical considerations were used to select a source. For our purposes, the
best performer is the source which produces the most thermal neutrons per starting
neutron at each depth. The production of thermal neutrons at 10 cm depth intervals
was simulated. In the simulation, a cube 1 m on side of air was placed above a 10
cm thick plane of concrete. Below the concrete plane, a cube 1 m on side sample
of pure quartz sand was placed which contained 10% moisture. This configuration
can be seen above in Fig. 4.1. In the following discussion, the reflector thickness will
refer to the difference between the inner radius of the reflector, defined by the neutron
generator tube, and the outer radius of the reflector. Length refers to the extent of the
reflector along the axial direction. Then, the number of thermal neutrons crossing
the boundaries between successive 10 cm thick soils was tallied using an F1 tally,
starting at the concrete–soil interface. The F1 tally computes the number of particles













∣∣∣Ωˆ · nˆ∣∣∣ νn(~r, Ωˆ, E, t) (4.2)
All fit data was taken from the tally at 20 cm depth to allow for the effects of both
the concrete surface and soil to be taken into consideration.
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Figure 4.1. Geometry of the neutron reflector.
31
Figure 4.2. Neutron energy spectrum of a DT generator coupled to a
depleted uranium reflector.
In addition to testing the bare sources, it was also desired to test the effects of
a neutron reflector. Both lead and depleted uranium were used as test materials in
both cylindrical and hemispherical configurations. Lead was selected for its naturally
occurring isotopes’ large (n, 2n) cross section at 14 MeV. Depleted uranium was
also chosen for its large (n, 2n) cross section at the same energy, but in addition
it also has large fission and (n, 3n) cross sections. The purpose of these reflectors
is to both multiply the number of neutrons emitted and produce a neutron energy
spectrum comparable similar to the Watt spectrum produced by 252Cf, as shown
in Fig. 4.2. This is advantageous because the higher energy 14 MeV neutrons will
take more soil depth to thermalize than lower energy neutrons, and so provide fewer
thermal neutrons at the soil surface, decreasing near surface bulk elements’ signal. If
a portion of the neutron energy spectrum is lower in energy, more thermal neutrons
will be produced at or near the soil surface than in the case of a bare neutron source,
resulting in more capture reactions.
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Figure 4.3. Thermal neutron population as a function of depth for various
source type and reflector combinations.
4.3 Reflector Effects
The general trend of neutron behaviour in soil can be seen from from Fig. 4.3. Two
competing effects determine the number of thermal neutrons available for capture
reactions at each depth in soil. The first of these is the thermalization of higher
energy neutrons. Because soil and concrete both contain hydrogen and other light
elements, they act as moderators, and so increase the number of thermal neutrons by
decreasing the energy of incoming neutrons through scattering. While the production
of thermal neutrons occurs at all levels within the simulation, there is an additional
competing effect, neutron absorption, which decreases the number of thermal neutrons
available. At first, there are more thermal neutrons produced than are being absorbed
by elements within the sample, and so the number of thermal neutrons increases. At
some point, the neutron absorption rate exceeds thermalization rate, and the number
of thermal neutrons decreases. At what depth this occurs depends on the average
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energy of the incoming neutrons. The higher the average neutron energy, the deeper
in soil this maximum occurs.
The advantage of the reflector can also be seen in Fig 4.3. The depth at which the
maximum number of thermal neutrons occurs, without regard to the absolute number
of neutrons, is much shallower for the DT generator and reflector combination (15 ±
1 cm), than for either a bare DD neutron generator (21 ± 1 cm), or a DT generator
(24 ± 1 cm). The saturated reflector also generates more thermal neutrons at each
depth than either source alone, producing a maximum of 0.4076 ± 0.00012 thermal
neutrons per starting neutron, as compared to 0.09047 ± 0.000054 for a DD source
and 0.049879 ± 0.000040 for a DT source. By producing more thermal neutrons at
each depth, a DT source coupled to a reflector produces many more capture reactions
than the DT or DD source alone.
4.4 Reflector Design
The next step in developing a neutron reflector is to decide on the dimensions of
that reflector. Because the reflector will be placed on a portable system, its mass must
be limited. It is assumed that the cart for deployment will have a similar size and class
of motor as that of a typical utility golf cart. Typical utility carts have a maximum
carrying capacity of a 450 kg. Since other equipment will need to be carried, half the
carrying weight will be allotted to the reflector, meaning the reflector mass is limited
to 225 kg. To determine the optimum reflector with this fixed mass, simulations
were conducted with MCNP. Since the neutron generator has a cylindrical shape, the
shape of the reflector will also be cylindrical, with a 6 cm radius half cylinder hollow
removed from the center of the half cylinder reflector to accommodate the neutron
generator.
For the purposes of the simulating the reflectors, the 14 MeV point source was
placed centered on the cylinder axis, flush with the surface of the reflector. The source
was placed 10 cm above the concrete surface. Depths are measured from the top of
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the concrete surface, so that the air–concrete interface is at 0 cm, the soil–concrete
interface is 10.16 cm, and the bound of the problem space is at 70 cm. Hereafter,
length shall refer to the length of the cylinder along its axis, and thickness shall refer
to the difference between the radius of the neutron generator channel and the outer
radius of the reflector.
4.4.1 Simulation Fit Equations
It is assumed that the reflector length will control only the probability that the
neutrons strike the reflector, while the thickness, will determine the probability that
the neutrons interact with the reflector material. Under this assumption, it is pre-
sumed that the neutron production data can be fitted to a function with two inde-
pendent terms, one relating to the solid angle of the reflector, a function of length,
and the other relating to the interaction probability, a function of thickness.
The total neutron population data can then be fitted to a combination of these
two terms, with addition of two parameters. The two fit equations represent the
probability of interaction, and so must be multiplied together to obtain the total
probability of interaction. This total probability is then multiplied by the number of
thermal neutrons produced by an infinite reflector. An additive constant must then
be added to the fit function to account for thermal neutrons produced by the source
in the absence of the reflector.
It is presumed that the thickness will control the probability of interaction. As
neutrons enter the reflector material, they react with its nuclei. The number of
neutrons which have interacted with the reflector is determined by the number of
remaining neutrons, N, which have not interacted with the reflector and the distance
travelled through the material, x. A differential equation then arises of the form of












However, the number of interest is the number of neutrons which have interacted with
the reflector, Nr, given by Eq.4.5.





This is the function that will be used to fit the thickness data.
The functional form of the length fit is determined by the solid angle that the
reflector presents. This is found using a spherical coordinate system, with the source
at the origin. The reflector is placed with its axis of symmetry along the z axis, with
its length centered on the xy plane. Since the reflector is a half cylinder and the
reflector has its axis on the z axis, the azimuthal angle varies from 0 to pi.
The polar angle extremes of the reflector are determined by the length of the
reflector. Let r0 be the perpendicular distance from the source to the surface of the
cylindrical reflector and L the total length. The angle from the top of the reflector








The solid angle of the reflector as viewed by the source is then given by Eq. 4.7. The














If the two parameters’ effects are assumed to be independent, then the probability that
the neutron strikes the reflector (event A) and interacts (event B), is Ptotal = PAPB.












PB = 1− e−xλ (4.9)
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The combination of these two equations then yields the final fit function, Eq. 4.10,
where n0 is the maximum number of thermal neutrons produced by the reflector, and
nb is the number of thermal neutrons produced by the source in the absence of the
reflector.










4.4.2 Reflector Thickness Fit Data
The first MCNP simulation conducted varied the thickness of the reflector. Length
was held fixed at 2 meters so that L
2
 r0 to approximate an infinitely long reflector.
The thickness of the reflector was then varied from 1 to 70 cm. The source and
reflector were placed 10 cm above the surface of the concrete. The results of this
simulation are plotted in Fig. 4.4. The concrete road surface occurs at depths between
0 and 10 cm, and the soil extends from 10 cm to 110 cm. All fit data was taken at 20
cm depth to allow the 14 MeV neutrons to be affected by the concrete and soil. This
depth is of the order of the mean free path of the 14 MeV neutrons.
Once the simulations were finished, the thickness data was fit to the presumed
form, given by Eq. 4.11. The n0 parameter reflects the maximum number of thermal
neutrons produced by the reflector, and nb the number produced in the absence of






Three important conclusions may be reached from this graph and fit. The first of
these is that fit equation is valid since the fit produced is very good as shown by
Fig. 4.4. The second is that the lead reflector has the potential to generate more
thermal neutrons per source neutron at depth than the uranium reflector. Taken to
infinite thickness, the lead reflector would produce 0.492 ± 0.0043 thermal neutrons
per source neutron at 20 cm depth, whereas the uranium reflector would produce
0.3979 ± 0.00054 thermal neutrons per source neutron at the same depth. Finally,
the characteristic length controlling thermal neutron production is smaller for the
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Figure 4.4. Thermal neutron population length fit for lead and depleted
uranium reflectors.
Fit Parameter Lead Reflector Values Uranium Reflector Values
n0 0.432 ± 0.00163 0.3314 ± 0.00037
λ(cm) 51.2 ± 0.456 16.58 ± 0.0403
nb 0.060 ± 0.00399 0.0665 ± 0.000394
Table 4.1.
Fit parameters for lead and uranium thickness fit.
uranium reflector by a little more than a factor of 3. This is of considerable importance
if the weight of the reflector is of practical importance, since weight of the reflector
will go as thickness squared. By having a smaller characteristic length, the uranium
reflector will produce more thermal neutrons at practical weights than a lead reflector
will, making the depleted uranium reflector the better choice.
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Fit Parameter Lead Reflector Values Uranium Reflector Values
c0 0.06703 ± 0.00092 0.1419 ± 0.00098
r0 (cm) 18.8 ± 0.56 16.7 ± 0.24
cb 0.026 ± 0.0010 0.022 ± 0.0011
Table 4.2.
Fit parameters for lead and uranium length fit.
4.4.3 Reflector Length Fit Data
The next step was to determine the number of thermal neutrons per starting
neutrons as a function of length. For this simulation, the reflector was kept at a
fixed thickness of 12.7 cm. This thickness is roughly two mean free paths for neutron
production in depleted uranium and one mean free path in lead. Length was varied
from 5.4 cm to 95 cm. The data was then fitted using the fit function in Eq. 4.12.
This fit equation reflects the solid angle of the reflector. Fit parameters can be found
in Table 4.2. Again, the presumed fit function is validated by a high quality fit.








4.4.4 Fixed Mass Reflector Fit Data
Given the validity of the fit functions, the reflector performance can be optimized
using the fit equation for both length and thickness at a fixed mass of 225 kg. Given
this fixed weight, reflectors of varying lengths and a constant mass were simulated
in MCNP, in both lead and depleted uranium. The results of these simulations are
shown in Fig. 4.6. The depleted uranium reflector was the best performer, with a
maximum of 0.1375 ± 0.00049 thermal neutrons per source neutron at a 30 cm long
and 6.7 cm thick. The data was fit to Eq. 4.13, which is Eq. 4.10 modified to account
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Figure 4.5. Thermal neutron population length fit for lead and depleted
uranium reflectors
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Figure 4.6. Thermal neutron population fixed mass fit for lead and de-
pleted uranium reflectors.
for the dependence between length and thickness at fixed mass. Fit parameters are
given in Table 4.3. Lead produced at maximum 0.1022 ± 0.00041 thermal neutrons
per source neutron at a 35 cm long and 8.7 cm thick. The bare DT source provides
0.049846 ± 0.00004 thermal neutrons per source neutron, so the depleted uranium




















Given that radioisotopic sources are unacceptable, the best fusion-based source
must be selected based on performance. Two considerations must be made when
selecting the source, signal strength and background noise. While the top layer of
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Fit Parameter Depleted Uranium Values Lead Values
n0 0.15 ± 0.0178 0.084 ± 0.013
λ (cm) 7.1 ± 1.17 5.6 ± 1.36
r0 (cm) 11 ± 1.15 12 ± 1.88
nb 0.04595 ± 0.00313 0.0480 ± 0.000311
Table 4.3.
Fit parameters for lead and uranium constant mass fit.
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material may or may not contain a target material, because it is close to the detectors
and neutron generator, it will always provide a significant source of noise.
This is particularly true in the modelled concrete surface, which contains 31% by
weight silicon (nitrogen’s primary background) [40], and is not expected to contain
target material. To make the system sensitive to deeply buried targets, the thermal
neutron population must be minimal near the surface, and increase with depth.
While it is desirable for the thermal neutron population near the soil surface to
be minimized, this must be balanced by the need to produce thermal neutrons within
a target material which may be buried at any depth. Should the material be near
the surface, detection should still be possible even with a small number of thermal
neutrons since the gamma rays produced are close to the detectors and do not pass
through a large amount of material that would otherwise attenuate the signal.
That the thermal neutron production must be biased towards greater depths is
especially true when gamma ray propagation is taken into account. The gamma
rays produced will spread isotropically from the point of production, and so the
number of gamma rays reaching the detectors goes as 1
r2
. Moreover, the gamma
rays can interact with the soil or concrete. In soil, the energy loss mechanism is
dominated by pair production accounting for 83% of the interactions, with Compton
scattering providing the balance. In concrete, roughly two thirds of the energy is
lost by Compton scattering and the remainder is lost through pair production [26].
Either loss mechanism will reduce a gamma ray’s energy enough to remove it from the
signal energy region in one interaction. Between geometric effects and soil interaction,
the expected signal produced by a deeply buried target will be much weaker than a
comparable target near the surface.
Because of attenuation by soil and geometric effects, it is more important for the
source to generate thermal neutrons far from the soil surface than it is to produce
thermal neutrons near the surface to maximize the gamma ray signal at depth and
minimize the noise. The optimal source, then, is the one which provides the fewest
thermal neutrons near the surface while maximizing the number of thermal neutrons
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far from the surface. To compare the various sources, two weighted averages will be
taken of the thermal neutron population at depths between 0 and 70 cm.
The first of these averages emphasizes the thermal neutron population near the
soil surface. This is accomplished by using the expected attenuation from both soil
interaction and geometric effects as a weighting factor. Since the expected attenuation





λi , where di is the depth of the thermal
neutron population in question, and λi is the gamma ray mean free path of the
material at depth di. This weighting factor becomes large at the surface, and decreases
considerably with depth, so this weighting factor will emphasize near surface thermal
neutron populations. The average is given by Eq. 4.14, where ni refers to the number
of thermal neutrons per source neutron at depth di.
By combining these two weighted averages, the optimal source may be identified.
As previously stated, the best source will produce more thermal neutrons far from the
soil surface, and fewer thermal neutrons near the soil surface. This can be identified
mathematically by taking the ratio of the far surface average population to the near
surface average population. The source with the highest ratio is then the one which
produces the most thermal neutrons far from the surface, and the least thermal






























Based on this optimization, the best source is a DT generator without a reflector,
which provides the best ratio. The reason for this can be seen in Fig. 4.3. With the
exception of the 70 cm thick reflectors, the different source types have very similar
behaviour at 40–50 cm depth. However, near the surface their behaviour is very
different. The sources with a lower energy spectrum produce the maximum number
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Source Type 〈nFS〉 〈nNS〉 〈nFS〉〈nNS〉
Bare DT 0.0303 0.00554 5.48
Bare DD 0.0473 0.0109 4.33
Optimum Pb + DT 0.0543 0.0127 4.27
Optimum DU + DT 0.0682 0.0173 3.96
Bare 252Cf 0.0348 0.00905 3.85
70 cm thick DU + DT 0.156 0.0881 1.77
70 cm thick Pb + DT 0.159 0.210 0.755
Table 4.4.
Simulation results of near to far surface average thermal neutron popula-
tion for various source types.
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of thermal neutron nearer to the surface than the higher higher energy DT source,
and the maximum number of thermal neutrons produced at that maximum is much
larger than the DT source. By producing more thermal neutrons near the surface,
more background will be created as this excess of thermal neutron captures on the
near-surface elements within the soil or the concrete, and unless the source is very
close to the surface, a comparable gain in signal from the detection target will not
be achieved. So, the lower energy source will not provide the signal significance
that the DT source will provide. Of the sources, the worst performer is the 70 cm
thick lead reflector, which produces considerably more thermal neutrons within the
concrete or surface than any other source. Based on performance, the DT source is
the best available, however there are other considerations that must be considered
when selecting a source.
Principle among these is safety. This automatically disqualifies the 252Cf source,
since this source is based on spontaneous fission and obviously cannot be deactivated.
Since this system will be placed in the hands of those with little or no radiation
safety training, and will also be used within civilian population centers, the inability
to turn off the source presents a considerable hazard, and so 252Cf is not a viable
source. However, both DD and DT sources may be deactivated, and are still candidate
sources.
Source mass is the other significant consideration. This consideration removes DD
sources from consideration. Since the fusion rate parameters are significantly smaller
for DD than DT at comparable energies, a much larger accelerator must be provided
to obtain similar neutron fluxes, which in turn also requires greater cooling. These
cooling and accelerator systems push the mass of these systems in excess of what can
reasonably be used on a portable system limited to 500 kg total mass. It was also
decided by the engineering team at the sponsor that even the 225 kg reflector mass
was undesirable for the purpose of a portable system, and so the reflectors have also
been removed from the candidate sources.
46
The best source in terms of performance, safety, and portability is a bare DT
source. This source provides the most favourable thermal neutron population distri-
bution, allows the source to be deactivated when not in use, is commonly commercially
available, and does not require extensive cooling equipment.
47
5. Detector selection and placement
Given the selected source, the next step is to determine the type of detector to use
in the system. This selection is dictated by both performance and practical consider-
ations. The detector type selected must both produce a strong signal relative to the
background, and be practical for a portable system that may be used in remote areas
with little technical infrastructure. The system must also be affordable to produce.
The detector types considered include high purity germanium, sodium iodide, and
BGO detectors.
5.1 Available Detector Types
5.1.1 Scintillation Detectors
The are two types of detectors relevant to gamma ray spectroscopy, the first of
which are scintillation detectors. The most common and readily available of these,
NaI and BGO, will be considered as larger sizes of these, necessary for the efficient
collection of spectra, are readily available without significant lead time. Both of these
scintillators are inorganic scintillators, whose scintillation mechanism depends on en-
ergy states resulting from the lattice structure of the crystal. The lattice structure
results in the valance band, with electrons bound to lattice sites, a band gap in which
no electron may exist, and a conduction band which contains electrons which are of
sufficient energy that they may freely move through the crystal.
When a particle strikes a scintillator, the energy of the particle is imparted to
electrons within the crystal. This can promote them from the valance to the con-
duction band, and thus create an electron hole pair. As the band gap in materials
is generally sufficiently large that energy transitions will not release photons in the
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visible spectrum, dopants are added, such as thallium in the case of NaI, to introduce
new energy states in the forbidden band so that energy transitions fall within the
visible range as well as enhance the rate at which holes are captured by lowering
the ionization energy required compared to that of a lattice site. If an electron is
recaptured at an activator site, it will do so by transitioning to a lower energy state
and releasing a photon. This photon can then be collected by the PMT tube to which
the scintillator is coupled, which is then transformed in to an electrical signal which
may be measured [41].
Of the two scintillator types, NaI has the superior light yield, giving 40,000 photons
per MeV [42], while BGO is 7 – 10% of this value [43], resulting in poorer energy
resolution. In addition, its higher index of refraction makes efficient light collection




for NaI, which will
allow a greater efficiency as its stopping power will be greater. However, despite its
increased stopping power, the primary issue with BGO is its resolution. NaI is capable
of 290 keV FWHM while BGO is capable of 350 keV FWHM at 10.8 MeV [44]. Given
the proximity of the 29Si background, the higher resolution of the NaI is preferred
over that of BGO, regardless of efficiency.
Another potential drawback to NaI detectors is the high capture cross section
of 127I, which also produces the radioactive isotope 128I, which has a half life of 25
minutes. This results in a strong 6.8 MeV peak and resultant continuum background
below this energy resulting from capture on 127I as well as a constant high background
after continuous operation for extended periods of time from the decay products of
128I [45].
5.1.2 Semiconductor Detectors
In contrast to scintillation detectors, semiconductors measure the energy of an
incoming gamma ray by measuring charge produced when the gamma ray deposits














Radiation length (cm) 2.59 1.12
Decay constant (ns) 230 300
Peak emmision (nm) 415 480
Relative light yield 100 7–10
Index of refraction 1.85 2.15
Peak excitation (nm) 290 280
Hygroscopicity strong none
Melting point (◦C) 651 1050
Radiation Hardness (rad) 103 104 – 105
Hardness (Mohs) 2 5
Cleavage 100 none
Table 5.1.
Properties of BGO and NaI scintillating crystals. [43]
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interaction of the gamma ray with the detector produces a cascade of electron-hole
pairs which are then collected by an applied electric field.
To provide the best signal, the detector material must have a high absorption
coefficient, indicating heavier materials as the absorption coefficient goes as Z2. The
material must further produce many electron-hole pairs for a given quantity of energy
() to provide good energy resolution, have a high electron-hole mobility to allow
collection of charge in a reasonable time, and be available in high purity. Properties
of materials suitable for semiconductor detectors are given in Table 5.3.
HPGe
At present, the best properties are those exhibited by germanium, which can be
manufactured at high purity, has an energy per electron-hole pair comparable to other
suitable materials, a large atomic number and density which allow measurement of
higher energy gammas, and further has an electron-hole mobility at least an order of
magnitude larger than any other suitable material. However, owing to a relatively
small band gap, germanium detectors require cooling to cryogenic temperatures to
prevent an excessive leakage current and thus obtain satisfactory energy resolution.
5.2 Performance considerations
Of performance considerations, the most important considerations are energy res-
olution, detection efficiency, and the maximum number of events the detector can
measure within a given time. As a result of the large number of charge carriers pro-
duced relative to scintillation detectors (3.38×105 electron hole pairs per MeV [46]),
HPGe detectors have the best energy resolution, producing peaks with a width of 21
keV FWHM at 10.8 MeV, based on measurements conducted in our lab. Scintillation
detectors produce far fewer photons per MeV, with NaI crystals producing 38,000
photons per MeV and BGO producing 8,200 photons per MeV [41] and as result have
















































































































































































































































290 keV FWHM and 350 keV FWHM respectively [44] at the same energy, assuming
the energy resolution goes as
√
Eγ, hence HPGe provides considerably better energy
resolution than either type of scintillation detector.
Both NaI and BGO provide better detection efficiencies at 10.8 MeV. BGO has
a detection efficiency of 25% at 10.8 MeV for a 3”x3” right cylinder crystal [47],
whereas NaI has a detection efficiency of 4% at the same size, and 8% for a 5”x4”
detector [48]. HPGe detectors have a much smaller detection efficiency, with an
efficiency of 3.2x10−3% at 10.8 MeV for a 43% relative efficiency detector [49], which
has roughly the same size as a 3”x3” right cylinder, making either scintillation detector
a better choice.
Scintillation detectors also allow more events to be detected within a given time.
While HPGe is limited to 40,000 events per second, NaI and BGO may both accept
higher rates. If it is assumed that the light decay time is the principle limitation on
event rate, and that a time separation of 4 decay times between events is sufficient to
prevent pile up, since under Poisson statistics the probability of two events occurring
within the decay time with that rate is 2.4%. Given that BGO has a time constant
of 0.3 µs [50] and NaI a time constant of 0.25 µs [51], these detectors may accept
800,000 and 1,000,000 events per second respectively in principle, however the phos-
phorescence of these scintillators will continually build. The added background of
light limits resolution. If 5% resolution is to be maintained, the rate must be limited
to 200 kHz.
Given the performance characteristics of the detectors, HPGe is not acceptable,
despite its excellent energy resolution, because both the efficiency and the maximum
event will reduce the number of counts to a point where these detectors will not
provide a reasonable detection time for a practical system. Of the remaining two
types of detectors, NaI is the best choice in terms of performance. While BGO may
have a better detection efficiency, NaI provides both better energy resolution and a
higher maximum event rate, negating any advantage the improved detection efficiency
of BGO detectors provides.
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5.3 Practical considerations
Practicality considerations also make HPGe undesirable for this application. As
previously stated, the system must be practical for a portable system deployed in areas
without technical infrastructure. One of the primary concerns with HPGe is cooling,
as the detectors must be maintained at liquid nitrogen temperatures for operation,
whereas either scintillation detector may be operated at room temperature. Because
of the cooling requirement, mechanical coolers must be provided, or a steady supply
of liquid nitrogen must be available. Mechanical cooling would considerably increase
the cost of the system at $5,000 per cooler. The mechanical coolers would also require
additional power generation capability, considering that typical coolers require 400
W of power [52], meaning a 10 detector system would require an additional 4 kW
of power generation, which would also decrease the portability of the system, and so
mechanical coolers are unacceptable.
If liquid nitrogen were employed to cool the detectors, the cooling nitrogen would
present a significant background to nitrogen found in a target of interest, meaning
that the liquid nitrogen would either have to be placed far from the detectors, or
be heavily shielded. Neither of these requirements is practical in a portable system.
A steady supply of liquid nitrogen could also not be guaranteed in likely areas of
deployment. Because there is no practical way to cool HPGe detectors with this
system, they are not practical for deployment.
Either type of scintillator would be practical for deployment. Neither detector
type requires cooling. Both types are radiation hard, and can also be obtained in
off the shelf ruggedized packages that would tolerate the mechanical shocks to be
expected in a portable system. Both types are also low cost, at roughly $10,000 for
a NaI detector package, and $3,000 for a BGO detector package. However, the NaI
has the performance advantage given its higher event acceptance rate and energy
resolution, and so is the best choice for the system.
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5.4 Detector placement
With the detector type selected, the next step is to determine the best arrangement
for the detector array. The best detector array is the one that produces the greatest
signal significance in the shortest amount of time for a detection target. To determine
if a preferable location exists, it was necessary to determine the angular distribution
of the gamma rays from both signal and background.
5.5 Angular distribution of gamma rays
In these simulations, a spherical 5 m in diameter was placed centered in the x and
y plane on the neutron source and center of an explosive device and centered on the
road-air interface in the z plane. The explosive devices were buried at depths ranging
from 1 to 60 cm. The spherical surface was further subdivided by conical surfaces
in 10 degree increments of the azimuthal angle, starting at θ = 10◦ and continuing
to θ = 80◦, the the 90◦ mark created by the plane of the concrete surface. And F1
surface current tally was collected on the 10◦ sections of spherical surface to obtain the
angular distribution of 10.8 MeV gammas resulting from the 14N(n,γ) reaction along
with the distribution of 10.6 MeV gammas resulting from the 29Si(n,γ) reaction which
serves as the primary background to the 10.6 MeV gamma rays. It is expected that
the nitrogen gamma rays will be largely biased towards the smaller azimuthal angles,
especially as burial depth of the device increases, considering that these gammas will
be attenuated as exp −µx through the soil and concrete, as increasing the angle means
going through an increasing large amount of soil. As the entire volume of soil contains
significant numbers of thermal neutrons, all layers of soil will contribute to the 10.6
MeV background gamma count, and as those coming from the near-surface layers of
the soil will be the least attenuated, they should contribute most to the count in the
detectors, and so this count may still have a dependence on angle, but not as strong
as that of the 10.8 MeV gammas.
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Figure 5.1. Angular distribution of N and Si counts for a 155mm shell at
a depth of 1 cm
The explosive devices were chosen to mimic typical munitions. The first repre-
sentative device is a US-made M-107 high explosive shell, represented by a cylinder
of explosive 60 cm in length and 7.747 cm in radius, covered with a 1.27 cm thick
layer of A-36 steel and containing 20.5 kg of explosive. The next device chosen was
designed to represent a US-made Mk-12 bomb, and is represented in the simulations
as a cylinder of explosive 78.74 cm in length and 17.78 cm in radius joined to a hemi-
sphere 17.78 cm in radius, covered with a 1.27 cm thick layer of A-36 steel, containing
164 kg of explosive. The final object selected was representative of an Italian made
VS-2.2 mine, and represented by a cylinder of explosive 5 cm high and 12 cm in
radius, covered by an 0.635 cm layer of polyethylene.
As can be seen from the Figs. 5.1 – 5.21, no preferable location exists where signal
outpaces the silicon background, however in the far surface cases, those in which the
explosive producing signal is the farthest from the neutron source, the signal generally
begins to drop off at the 40◦ mark. As a result, the detector array will designed to
fall within this cone.
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Figure 5.2. Angular distribution of N and Si counts for a 155mm shell at
a depth of 10 cm
Figure 5.3. Angular distribution of N and Si counts for a 155mm shell at
a depth of 20 cm
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Figure 5.4. Angular distribution of N and Si counts for a 155mm shell at
a depth of 30 cm
Figure 5.5. Angular distribution of N and Si counts for a 155mm shell at
a depth of 40 cm
58
Figure 5.6. Angular distribution of N and Si counts for a 155mm shell at
a depth of 50 cm
Figure 5.7. Angular distribution of N and Si counts for a 155mm shell at
a depth of 60 cm
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Figure 5.8. Angular distribution of N and Si counts for a VS-2.2 mine at
a depth of 1 cm
Figure 5.9. Angular distribution of N and Si counts for a VS-2.2 mine at
a depth of 10 cm
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Figure 5.10. Angular distribution of N and Si counts for a VS-2.2 mine
at a depth of 20 cm
Figure 5.11. Angular distribution of N and Si counts for a VS-2.2 mine
at a depth of 30 cm
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Figure 5.12. Angular distribution of N and Si counts for a VS-2.2 mine
at a depth of 40 cm
Figure 5.13. Angular distribution of N and Si counts for a VS-2.2 mine
at a depth of 50 cm
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Figure 5.14. Angular distribution of N and Si counts for a VS-2.2 mine
at a depth of 60 cm
Figure 5.15. Angular distribution of N and Si counts for a Mk-12 bomb
at a depth of 1 cm
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Figure 5.16. Angular distribution of N and Si counts for a Mk-12 bomb
at a depth of 10 cm
Figure 5.17. Angular distribution of N and Si counts for a Mk-12 bomb
at a depth of 20 cm
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Figure 5.18. Angular distribution of N and Si counts for a Mk-12 bomb
at a depth of 30 cm
Figure 5.19. Angular distribution of N and Si counts for a Mk-12 bomb
at a depth of 40 cm
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Figure 5.20. Angular distribution of N and Si counts for a Mk-12 bomb
at a depth of 50 cm
Figure 5.21. Angular distribution of N and Si counts for a Mk-12 bomb
at a depth of 60 cm
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Efficiency Effects
In addition to the radius of the detector array, another factor that must be decided
is the angle of the detector with respect to the ground. To be useful for spectroscopy
purposes, a gamma ray’s energy must be fully absorbed by the detector material.
In the case of an infinitely large detector, all energy is absorbed because the initial
photon and all subsequent photons of lesser energy have a track length sufficient
for the photon to interact with the material and impart its energy to the detector
material.
With a real detector of finite size, however, there is no guarantee that a photon will
be absorbed. Classic examples of this include first and second escape lines, which are
created by photons which interact with the detector material through pair production,
but one or both of the 511 keV annihilation gamma rays escapes the detector, leaving
peaks 511 keV and 1022 keV from the true peak.
If the signal is to be maximized, then the path length the signal gamma rays travel
through must be maximized. To understand the dependence of the full photopeak
efficiency on the location and angle at which the gamma ray strikes the detector
surface, an MCNP study was conducted.
In this study, a photon source was created which put out a monoenergetic beam
of photons directed at a 10.16 cm × 10.16 cm right cylindrical NaI detector. A 0.5
mm thick layer of aluminum covered the cylinder, which is typical of NaI detectors
produced by Canberra, a scintillation detector manufacturer.
The photon source and NaI detector were then enclosed in a 1 m sphere in which
there was only a vacuum. The photon source was then directed at the detector at 0,
2.54, 5.08, and 7.62 cm from the detector’s center. For each location, the angle at
which the photon struck the detector surface was varied from -80◦ to +80◦ with respect
to the normal from the detector surface. An energy deposition (F8) tally was then
used to determine the energy deposition in the NaI, yielding the energy spectrum
that would be produced by a NaI detector. Gaussian energy broadening was also
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applied to the F8 tally to reflect the energy resolution typical of NaI detectors. The
resolution of detectors is given by
FWHM = a+ b
√
E + cE2 (5.1)
Broadening constants of a = −0.00789 MeV b = 0.06769 MeV 12 c = 0.21159 MeV−1
were used [53] to simulate actual detector behavior.
Results from this simulation are given in Figs. 5.22 – 5.25. Among the more inter-
esting results of this simulation are that the primary photopeak at 10.8 MeV seems
undesirable to indicate the presence of bulk explosive. This becomes particularly ob-
vious when looking at the region of interest as shown in Fig. 5.25. This shows the en-
ergy spectrum in the vicinity of the 10.8 MeV peak produced by 14N with a 10.8 MeV
photon source directed at the center of the detector with an angle of incidence of -80◦.
As can be seen, the 10.8 MeV peak is barely noticeable, and in practice automated
peak search routines have difficulty locating this peak without finding numerous su-
perfluous peaks. By contrast, the first escape peak at 10.289 MeV is prominent and
easily found by automated peak search routines. Moreover, better efficiency is gener-
ally obtained at the 10.289 MeV line. While the maximum efficiency seen at the 10.8
MeV line of 0.144368±2.88736×10−5 is higher than the that of the 1st escape peak
at 0.106533±3.19599e×10−5, the efficiency across the range of angles of incidence is
higher for the 1st escape peak. In particular, at the extremes of angles of incidence,
the primary photopeak has its lowest efficiency of 0.0154756±1.23805×10−5, while
the 1st escape peak’s lowest efficiency is 0.0620816±2.48326×10−5.
This effect is likely the result of the small size of the detector. When an electron-
positron pair are formed, by momentum conservation, the two particles are emitted
anti-parallel to each other. Given a random orientation within the detector, one
particle is likely to experience a long track length in the detector material while the
other experiences a relatively short track, meaning that it is likely that only one
instead of both particles will expend its full energy in the detector, and in doing so
create a first escape peak that is more prominent than the primary photopeak at 10.8
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Figure 5.22. Primary full photopeak efficiency for the 10.8 MeV line
Figure 5.23. Full photopeak efficiency for the 1st escape peak of the 10.8
MeV line
MeV. The 1st escape peak is thus a better choice for detection as it should generally
be more prominent than the primary photopeak.
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Figure 5.24. Full photopeak efficiency for the 2nd escape peak of the 10.8
MeV line
Figure 5.25. Energy spectrum produced by a 4”×4” NaI detector in the




Central to a TNA system is the selection of a timing gate for the detector. In the
11 MeV region of the gamma ray spectrum, there are few lines from thermal capture.
As a result, the bulk of the background in this region will result from the presence
of inelastic scatter reactions and their corresponding backgrounds. Inelastic scatter
reactions occur soon after release of the neutron pulse, as these reactions typically
have threshold energies above 6 MeV, and so after a period of time neutrons of
sufficient energy to participate in an inelastic scatter reaction will either scatter away
from the point of interrogation, or thermalize and lack sufficient energy to produce
an inelastic scatter reaction. To determine this, a simulation was conducted in which
a 6 m by 6 m by 6 m cube of soil was placed below a 6 m by 6 m by 10.16 cm concrete
surface. A cube of air 6 m by 6 m by 6 m was then placed above the concrete. A
155 mm shell containing explosive was placed at a depth of 30 cm to produce signal.
An F1 tally of photons was then collected at the concrete-air interface. This F1 tally
was further binned by time in 10 µs bins and by 10 keV increments of energy to allow
measurement of the spectrum of photons leaving the soil as a function of time from
neutron release.
The results of this simulation can be seen in Fig. 5.26. As can be seen from the
graph, the total count across all energies decreases rapidly with time. By 20 µs, the
total count across the spectrum has been reduced by three orders of magnitude, while
the signal count has only been reduced by roughly a factor of two. As a result, the
introduction of a timing gate will allow for a substantial reduction in the dead time
of the detectors and the background of the 10.8 MeV line. The effect of gating can be
seen in Fig. 5.27. Without the gate, no peaks are apparent in the signal region. With
the gate included, however, background in the signal region reduces dramatically,
making the 10.8 MeV nitrogen line and its 10.6 MeV background from silicon plainly
visible.
71
Figure 5.26. Total and signal background counts emerging from the
ground as a function of time.
To determine the proper beginning and ending time for the gate, a simulation was
run using the same deck with the count collection starting at 10 µs, and a variable
end of the collection time, starting at 20 µs through 200 µs in 10 µs increments. This
was repeated for a start of collection at 15 and 20 µs. As can be seen from Fig. 5.28,
there is little difference in the number of counts accumulated between these initial
points, nor is there a significant reduction in the background in the signal region. To
allow faster repetition of the collection cycle, and because there is little disadvantage
in doing so, collection with the detectors should begin 10 µs after the neutron pulse
is turned off.
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Figure 5.27. The effect of a 10 µs gate on the spectrum of gamma rays
leaving the soil.
Figure 5.28. Accumulated signal gamma rays crossing the soil-concrete
interface as a function of starting and ending collection times.
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6. Shielding
In order for the detection system to be most effective, the detectors must be shielded
from excess neutrons and gamma rays. The goal of this is to reduce activation of the
the crystal, prevent detector damage, and limit degradation of detector performance
caused by afterglow created by excess gamma rays, which in turn will all degrade
detection time of the explosive.
It is important to shield the detectors from neutrons, both because of radiative
capture reactions on the crystal material, and because fast neutrons can damage
the crystalline structure of the scintillation material, resulting in degradation of per-
formance. Slow neutrons further degrade performance by participating in thermal
capture reactions on 127I and 23Na, with cross sections of 10 b and 0.53 b, respec-
tively [31]. These capture reactions not only release prompt gamma rays, but further
result in the radioactive isotopes 128I and 24Na, with half lives of 25 minutes and 15
hours, resulting in background spectra and increasing the gamma ray fluence which
will in turn increase afterglow [54].
It is then necessary to shield the detectors from neutrons of all energies using
a shield, but that shield itself may contribute prompt gamma rays or additional
neutrons, as is the case in materials such as lead, a material often used to shield
gamma rays, which participates in inelastic scatter reactions which produce gamma
rays, but also in reactions such as the (n, 2n) reaction which multiplies the number
of free neutrons.
Shielding may be provided by either absorption or reflection. In absorption, the
incident neutron is consumed in a reaction, whereas in reflection it is scattered away
from the shielded area. That reflection may either change the energy of the incident
neutron, so that moderation occurs, or may leave the energy of the neutron largely
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unchanged, which is referred to as reflection. The energy lost during an elastic scatter











In hydrogen, for which A = 1, this becomes 1
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and so light nuclei are preferred for moderation, while heavy nuclei are preferred for
reflection.
6.1 Moderation
Moderators are often used in combination with an absorber to reduce neutron
population, since the neutron absorption cross section is usually strongly dependant
on energy, with greater cross sections occurring at lower energies. Many neutron ab-
sorbers have absorption cross sections which go as the inverse of the incident neutron
speed, and so decreasing neutron speed via moderation may make a neutron shield
based on neutron absorption more effective.
Hydrogen is generally the preferred moderator nucleus as it reduces incident neu-
tron energy by half on average. Common hydrogen containing materials used for
moderation are paraffin wax and both heavy and light water. While both 1H and
2H cannot participate in inelastic scattering reactions which often yield gamma rays,
both may capture a thermal neutron, producing a gamma ray in the process. Hy-
drogen produces a 2.2 MeV line and has a thermal capture cross section of 334 mb,
while deuterium has an 0.5 mb cross section and produces a 6.3 MeV gamma [31,32].
While hydrogen-bearing materials may be favorable for moderation, the MeV energy
gamma rays produced by thermal capture reactions produced may require consider-
able shielding material on their own.
Other common moderating materials are carbon, often in the form of graphite,
beryllium in its metallic form, and 7Li, usually as a salt. Beryllium is both expensive
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to aquire and toxic. It also has a 8.6 mb thermal capture cross section, with the
most probable gamma ray produced having an energy of 6.8 MeV. 7Li also has a 46
mb thermal capture cross section, and produces its strongest line at 2.0 MeV [31,32].
Unlike beryllium or lithium, carbon has no significant thermal capture lines, and so
will produce less background than either maeterial. It is also inexpensive and readily
available, making it a common choice for a moderator, despite its larger A which will
in turn result in a greater thickness required to provide moderation.
The required thickness for a moderator to reduce a neutron’s energy between two
values may be calculated. A convenient measurement of energy loss is given by the







The number of collisions, N , required to reduce the energy of a neutron to a given









The RMS distance travelled in a three dimensional random walk, dr, is related to the






The appropriate step size for moderation is the mean free path between elastic scat-






where σi is the elastic scattering cross section of the ith isotope and ni is its number
density.
6.2 Absorbtion
There are a number of nuclei with large absorption cross sections that either do
not produce gamma rays or produce low energy gamma rays that are readily shielded.
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These include 6Li, 10B, and 113Cd. 3He and Gd are also effective neutron absorbers,
but are extremely expensive. Cadmium is also an effective neutron absorber, but is
highly toxic and emits gamma rays at 558, 576, 725, 806, 1210, 1364 and 1399 keV
during its capture process, making it less preferable than lithium and boron. Of these
materials, lithium and boron are preferred as both have significant absorption cross
sections, and in addition generate no gamma radiation in the case of lithium, and
only a 482 keV gamma ray in the case of boron.
6.3 Bulk material testing
6.3.1 Candidate Materials
Two elements were identified as a basis for an absorption-based neutron shield,
lithium and boron. Lithium presents the significant advantage in that its most sig-
nificant neutron absorption reaction, the 6Li(n, α)3H reaction, produces no gamma
radiation and has a cross section of 941 b [31]. However, it also produces tritium,
which presents a safety hazard as a result of its radioactive decay. It also present a
proliferation concern, and further the trapped gas can cause bulging of the structure
of the shielding material. Boron, by contrast, has a 3838 b neutron absorption cross
section, mostly as a result of the 10B(n,αγ)7Li reaction. While this reaction does
create a gamma ray, its energy is only 482 keV, and so is readily shielded by a thin
lead shield.
Lithiated and borated polyethylene both present the advantage of a high hydro-
gen content, which, as a result of the its low atomic wieght is an extremely effective
moderator, per Eq. 6.1. Since the neutron absorption cross sections of both boron
and lithium follow the a 1
v
dependence, lower energy neutrons will capture with higher
probability than higher energy neutrons, and so it is ostensibly preferable to reduce
the incident 14 MeV neutrons in the shielding material via moderation. The presence
of hydrogen also presents a problem as a result of the 334 mb thermal capture cross
section, which produces a 2.2 MeV gamma ray that will require substantial shielding
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to prevent a considerable background to the detectors, especially given their prox-
imity. Another significant disadvantage the low density of polyethylene, at 0.9 g/cc,
which limits the macroscopic cross section for both scattering and neutron absorption,
which will limit the efficacy of polyethylene shields with a practical size.
Boron carbide has the advantage that it does not create any appreciable ther-
mal capture gamma rays, beyond a 478 keV gamma produced by boron with 94%
probability. It also has a high density relative to the polyethylene-based materials at
2.52 g/cc, which will results in a larger macroscopic cross section for the absorption
reaction. Carbon also has no significant thermal capture lines, though does have a
strong 4.4 MeV fast neutron line. While any fast lines will not be recorded in the
spectrum as a result of detector gating, these gammas will still present a concern as
a result of the afterglow effect of scintillation spectrometry, and so can still present a
concern as it relates to the resolution of the detectors. Carbon will also moderate the
incoming 14 MeV neutrons, though to a lesser degree than hydrogenous materials.
Lithium fluoride is another possibility, and is easily slip cast in to a number
of possible forms. It also holds a density advantage over the polyethylene-based
materials at a density of 2.64 g/cc. Lithium fluoride retains the advantage that
neutron absorption will be non-radiative. Fluorine does produce two strong high
energy capture lines at 6.6 MeV and 1.6 MeV, but has a capture cross section of only
10 mb, and so background resulting from the shield should be minimal. It will still
present the issue of tritium production as a result of the neutron absorption reaction.
Lead will not provide moderation or significant neutron absorption. Instead, it
can act as a shield by reflecting incident neutrons, as opposed to the above discussed
materials which will function as shields via neutron absorption. Since lead has a
large atomic mass, when high energy neutrons collide with lead atoms, they will be
scattered with nearly the same energy as their incident energy. Thus, by elastic scat-
tering, a large number of incident neutrons will be reflected rather than transmitted
or absorbed by the shield. Lead might, however, present an issue as a result of its (n,
2n) cross section. The neutron products of this reaction will have low energy, and so
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could present an issue. Moreover, lead produces three strong fast lines at 7.37, 6.74,
and 6.80 MeV. While a lead shield would self shield these capture gamma rays to a
degree, it would also block any signal gamma rays, and so could result in a decline of
system performance.
6.3.2 Shielding performance
To select the best shielding material, an initial run was made in MCNP. A 5 m
by 5 m plane of the test material was used in the simulation. On either side of the
material, a cell containing vacuum was placed. A 14 MeV point source of neutrons
was then placed centered on the square, and 0.5 cm above the material’s surface. An
F1 tally of the neutrons passing the surface of the material opposite the source was
then collected. Plots were then made of the neutrons with E ≥ 6 MeV, the threshold
of most fast neutron reactions, and the thermal neutrons (defined as having E ≤ 0.173
eV, the energy at which the exponential term in the Boltzmann distribution at room
temperature is equal to 0.001). Candidate materials selected include boron carbide,
a ceramic material, borated polyethylene, polyethylene lithiated with both natural
lithium and 90% enriched lithium, lithium fluoride, and lead. The results of these
simulations can be seen in Figs. 6.1 – 6.12.
As thicker shields will limit portability of the system, the required thickness to
reduce the fast neutron population by two orders of magnitude will be used to evalu-
ate materials, along with the thermal neutron population at that thickness. Results
are given in Table 6.1. As can be seen from the table, the best performers are boron
carbide and lithium fluoride, with both reducing the fast neutron population to the
requisite level at 15 cm, with boron carbide producing a 10% lower population given
the same thickness, likely as a result of boron’s larger neutron absorption cross sec-
tion. Boron carbide does, however, have a 4% higher thermal neutron population
at this thickness. The mass required of moderator material is roughly comparable,
with boron carbide having a slightly smaller mass. Borated, enriched lithiated, and
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non-enriched lithiated polyethylene all required 25 cm of material to reduce the fast
neutron population by two orders of magnitude, with borated polyethylene perform-
ing the best, followed by enriched lithiated polyethylene, and non-enriched lithiated
polyethylene. All of these require the same mass of material. The worst performer is
lead. Although comparable in terms of reduction of the neutron population, the mass
required to reach this reduction was an order of magnitude above the other candidate
materials, and well above that which would feasibly fit in a portable system.
From the initial results, either boron carbide or lithium fluoride would be the
best choices for shielding material. Lead is simply too heavy to be of use and has
performance comparable to materials that are far lighter. The mass required for any of
the polyethylene materials is comparable to that required of lithium fluoride or boron
carbide, but the bulk significantly greater. Moreover, the polyethylene materials will
require, in addition to the bulk material, an additional cladding of lead of significant
thickness to cover the shielding material to shield the 2.2 MeV gamma rays produced
by thermal capture on hydrogen within the materials.
Of the two remaining materials, boron carbide the best options, given that the
only backgrounds it will produce are the relatively easily shielding 478 keV rays from
boron, as compared to that of fluorine at 7.37, 6.74, and 6.80 MeV. In addition, boron
carbide is an extremely tough ceramic, and is often used create armor for tanks as a
result of its toughness. In the event of detonation of an undetected IED, the neutron
shield might limit damage to system components. By contrast, lithium fluoride is a
brittle glass, and so might present issues both in a rugged environment, and would
not provide similar protection.
6.3.3 Shielding Design Considerations
With the material for the shield determined, the shielding must be designed to fit
the application. In this case, there are three things that the detectors must be pro-


































































































































































































































































Figure 6.1. Thermal neutron population as function of thickness for a
boron carbide shield.
Figure 6.2. Thermal neutron population as function of thickness for a
boron carbide shield.
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Figure 6.3. Fast neutron population as function of thickness for a borated
polytheylene shield.
Figure 6.4. Thermal neutron population as function of thickness for a
borated polytheylene shield.
83
Figure 6.5. Fast neutron population as function of thickness for an en-
riched lithiated polytheylene shield.
Figure 6.6. Thermal neutron population as function of thickness for an
enriched lithiated polytheylene shield.
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Figure 6.7. Fast neutron population as function of thickness for a unen-
riched lithiated polytheylene shield.
Figure 6.8. Thermal neutron population as function of thickness for a
unenriched lithiated polytheylene shield.
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Figure 6.9. Fast neutron population as function of thickness for a lithium
fluoride shield.
Figure 6.10. Thermal neutron population as function of thickness for a
lithium fluoride shield.
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Figure 6.11. Fast neutron population as function of thickness for a lead
shield.
Figure 6.12. Thermal neutron population as function of thickness for a
lead shield.
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tered from the soil, and background gamma rays from the soil and any shielding
material. At the same time, the shield must allow the passage of the 10.8 MeV
gamma rays which serve as the trigger for the presence of explosives.
To best shield the detector from the neutrons produced by both the DT generator
and secondary reactions within the soil, a plane of boron carbide will be placed above
the neutron generator and soil.
Reduction of soil background
To test the reduction of both neutrons and gamma rays emitted by the soil, a 6
m x 6 m x 6 m cube of world average soil was created. Above this, a centimetre thick
layer of air was placed which was also 6 m x 6 m. Above this, a boron carbide layer
was placed of varying thickness, also 6 m by 6 m in extent. A neutron source was
then placed which directed 14.1 MeV neutrons downward at the soil. An F1 tally of
the neutron and gamma ray flux was then collected at the bottom air-boron carbide
interface and another was collected at the top of the block of boron carbide. Both
tallies were set up to tally only upward moving particles, that is gamma rays and
neutrons entering the boron carbide and those leaving it, not those that are merely
reflected by either surface.
The primary objective of the boron carbide shielding is to reduce the neutron
population to limit damage and neutron interactions with the detectors. As boron
carbide is a low average Z material, and gamma ray attenuation is proportional to
Z2, it will not strongly shield incident gamma rays. The mean free path of 10.8 MeV
gamma rays in this material is 22 cm, meaning that the boron carbide shield can be
made relatively thick without sacrificing significant signal. It will, however, provide
greater protection against the low energy gamma rays which dominate the gamma
ray background. The strong 511 keV background resulting from pair production, for

















14.1 MeV Neutron Population
Figure 6.13. 14 MeV neutron population as a function of shielding thick-
ness
Three different neutron populations were examined, including the original 14.1
MeV neutron population, the thermal neutron population, and the total neutron
population. The population of each of these was collected using an F1 tally placed at
the top of the boron carbide shield. Only upward moving neutrons were tallied using
a cosine bin. The results can be seen in the Figs. 6.13 – 6.15. A thickness of 20 cm
is sufficient to reduce the 14 MeV neutron population by two orders of magnitude,
the thermal population by an order of magnitude, and the total neutron population
by an an order of magnitude while retaining 40% of the 10.8 MeV gamma rays and
reducing the low energy gamma ray background by roughly an order of magnitude.
Redection of Gamma Ray Backgrounds
In addition to excess neutrons, it would be ideal to reduce the number of gamma
rays reaching the detectors to prevent afterglow effects as well as reduce the count
rate from background, which could result in excessive detector dead time. Among

















































Gated Gamma Ray Spectrum
20 cm Boron Carbide Shield
Figure 6.16. Gated gamma ray spectrum from a 20 cm boron carbide
shield
in the soil. Taking a weighted average of the energy of the gamma rays that exit the








where Ei is the energy of the ith bin and ci is the number of counts yields an average
energy of 760 keV. It would be desirable to reduce this background, however any
shielding of this background will also result in attenuation of the 10.8 MeV gamma
rays resulting from interaction with nitrogen within the explosives. However, reducing
the incoming gamma rays will reduce the dead time experienced by the detector. As
the spectra in Figs. 6.16 and 6.17 show, this spectrum is dominated by low energy
gamma rays. These background low energy gamma rays are more easily shielding
then the strong 10.8 MeV nitrogen line. The mean free path of 511 keV gamma rays
in lead, is 0.71 cm and that for the average 760 keV gamma rays is 0.99 cm compared
to 1.8 cm for 10.8 MeV gamma rays.
As an initial attempt to get an idea of the thickness required for a reasonable















Total Gamma Ray Spectrum
20 cm Boron Carbide Shield
Figure 6.17. Total gamma ray spectrum from a 20 cm boron carbide shield
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used to shield gamma rays, was placed directly above the layer of boron carbide. This
layer covered the extent of the problem space in the xy plane, and was then extended
along the z axis between 1 and 5 cm in 1 cm increments. The resulting gamma ray
spectrum was collected at the top and bottom of the lead layer, with cosine binning
set to collect only upward moving gamma rays.
While the addition of lead will reduce the overall strength of the dominant lower
energy gamma ray background, it also adds the complication of reducing the solid
angle each detector will represent. By necessity, the additional dimension in the z
direction that the layer of lead adds will also move it farther from the ground and
explosive. As a result, the solid angle each detector represents will decrease. As a
result, the signal produced by the detector will also decrease. However, the parasitic
material of the ground will continue to produce low energy background gamma rays
through pair production. As the extent of the ground is much greater than that of the
explosive, the effect of moving the detector farther away may not have as significant
an effect as it does on the nitrogen signal. However it must be kept in mind that the
population of neutrons producing this secondary radiation will also decrease as the
distance to the neutron source is increased.
To fully understand this, a series of simulations were run in which a lead plate
with dimensions 25 cm x 25 cm by a variable thickness was placed above the boron
carbide neutron shield. Below the boron carbide shield, a 1 cm thick air layer was
placed. This was followed by a 600 cm on side cube of soil containing a 10 cm in
radius cylinder center on the z-axis of RDX that was 40 cm long to produce a nitrogen
signal.
NaI detectors are limited to being able to count roughly 200,000 counts per second
in typical spectroscopy applications without encountering excessive dead time which
in turn will increase the effective collection time required to detect explosive. Thus,
the goal of the lead gamma ray shielding is to decrease the total gamma ray count
relative to the nitrogen signal count at 10.8 MeV.
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1 6.5×10−7 7.40×10−5 8.78×10−3
2 3.5×10−7 4.66×10−5 7.51×10−3
3 2×10−7 2.96×10−5 6.74×10−3
4 1.1×10−7 1.86×10−5 5.92×10−3
5 6×10−8 1.19×10−5 5.04×10−3
Table 6.2.
Lead simulation results
Let ct represent the total gamma ray count and cN the total nitrogen gamma ray
count, Rγ,t the total gamma ray rate per source neutron, Rγ,N the nitrogen gamma
ray rate per source neutron, and RG be the rate at which neutrons are produced by
generator and t the amount of time the signal is observed. It is desirable to maximize










The results of these simulations can be seen in Table 6.2. As is shown, the value of
the ratio decreases with increasing thickness, indicating that the lead shielding does
not assist in improving the signal strength by limiting incoming gamma rays, and so
the use of lead shielding is detrimental and will not be used.
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7. System Performance
Given the shielding design, the performance of the system is now considered. To do
this, a deck was made consisting of a 4 m × 4 m × 4 m cube of soil, in which various
explosives were placed. Three different devices were considered. These include an
M107 155 mm shell, a VS-2.2 antitank mine, and a Mk-12 bomb. Also considered
were different road surfaces, including dirt and conventional concrete. Simulations
were run with the detection array 10.16 cm above the road surface. Each device was
run with a depth, defined as the distance from the top of the ground-air interface to
the surface of the object closest to ground-air surface. For the dirt road, depths of 1
cm, 15 cm, 30 cm, 45 cm, and 60 cm were used. For those with road surfaces, depths
of 15 cm, 30 cm, 45 cm, and 60 cm were used as the road surface itself occupied the
upper 10 cm.
7.1 Signal and background calculation
The heart of this system’s performance is the reliance on the fact that thermal
capture lines above 8 MeV are relatively rare. Unfortunately, the F8 tally, known
as the energy deposition tally, which is used to mimic detector response in MCNP
simulations does not allow time binning. As a result, it is not possible to use the F8
tally to simulate detector response in a system in which the detectors will be gated off,
as is done in thermal neutron analysis to take advantage of the reduced background
in the signal region above 8 MeV. Instead, the detector signal and background must
be estimated using the gamma ray flux in to the detector array.
95
7.1.1 Photopeak efficiency calculation
This flux was collected by placing an F1 tally surrounding the detectors. The flux
was cosine binned such that only particles entering the detectors were counted in the
flux tally. To determine the number of gamma rays which will actually appear under
the peak associated with the true energy of the 10.8 MeV signal and its 10.6 MeV
silicon background, simulations were run for a 10.16 cm × 10.16 cm × 40.64 cm NaI
detector. An F8 energy deposition tally was conducted for varying angles with respect
to the surface of the surface of the detector. The entrance point was varied across the
surface, and runs were made with the incoming angle θ such that −80◦ ≤ θ ≤ 80◦ in
increments of 10
◦
. These tallies were collected with the half distance of the detector
cut in to thirds, and a collection of tallies was made for each of 9 points, including
the detector’s center point. To determine the average full photopeak efficiency, the
total counts under the peak were found for each angle and position, and the efficiency
determined. The average efficiency of the detector was found by taking the mean of all
the efficiency values over all positions and angles. This average value was determined
to be 9.5% ± 0.11%. This value will be used to determine the number of signal and
background gamma rays which enter the detector and are detected by it.
7.1.2 Signal Estimation
The surface flux on the detectors must be utilized to estimate the signal as the
energy deposition tally does not allow time binning, and thus cannot provide a simu-
lation of the signal produced in the detectors in pulsed mode operation, as collection
of spectra in the detectors cannot be limited in time, but instead collect over the
duration of the simulation. The flux spectrum will be missing two important features
of the energy deposition in to the detector and thus the resulting spectrum, the ef-
ficiency of the detector as well as the broadening of lines associated with imperfect
collection of the energy of each gamma ray.
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To accomplish this estimation, a series of simulations was conducted. In these
simulations, a photon source was placed which corresponded to one of the 256 different
bin energies from the surface flux. The position of this source was moved across nine
different locations evenly distributed on the detector face. For each of these locations,






degree increments. The results for these
simulations for each bin energy were then averaged over all locations and angles.
This allows the estimated detector response to take in to account the effects of the
Compton continuum, detection efficiency, as well as the first and second escape peaks
for all bins across the entire surface flux. Let c
′
i be the resultant count in the ith bin
of the spectrum, cj be the original count in the jth bin of the flux tally, and i,j be
the simulated count per source gamma in the ith energy bin in the detector response
simulation for a gamma ray in the jth energy bin in the flux tally. The resulting







In addition, Gaussian broadening of each bin must be taken in to account. This
can be simulated by using the known dependence of resolution on the energy of the
measured photon. This dependence is expressed as
FWHM = a+ b
√
E + cE2 (7.2)
where a = −0.00789 MeV b = 0.06769 MeV 12 c = 0.21159 MeV−1 are the values of
the parameters for NaI detectors [53]. Using this formula, the resolution at any given
point in the spectrum can be calculated. The counts may then be redistributed among
the bins by generating a Gaussian distribution for each point, then redistributing the
counts in bins with corresponding energies. This can be done for each bin resulting
from the F1 tally, resulting in a broadened spectrum. Given the combination of the
simulated detection efficiencies, Compton continuum, escape peaks, and Gaussian
broadening, the resultant modified surface flux should provide an estimated detec-




Given the computed spectrum, it must then be decided if the counts within the
region of interest are significant. The number of counts under the peak above back-
ground may be estimated as






ci if ci is the number of counts in the ith bin, B1 the number of
counts in the bin outside of the region of interest to the left of the peak, and B2 is
the number of counts just outside the right of the peak, and n is the number of bins
between B1 and B2.



























where Nn is the total number of neutrons released. Solving for t, The number of
neutrons released and the time required must then be determined. The maximum
generator rate will be determined by the maximum number of counts per second
that the detector can tolerate without excessive dead time due to pulse pile up. The
characteristic decay time for a light pulse in a NaI detector is 250 ns. Assuming
Poisson distributed counts, the probability of one count or more during the light
pulse decay is
P = 1− e−rτd (7.6)
Thus,




Assuming a 5% chance is acceptable, this amounts to a rate of 200,000 cps. The
detector rate, RD is related to the generator rate by Rγ,A, the total number of gammas
deposited per source neutron across all energy bins, by






In pulsed mode operation, the generator is also only on for a portion of the collection
cycle. Let ta be the duration per pulse that the generator is on, and tc be the total
length of the cycle. Then the number of neutrons released per cycle is



















t = βt (7.11)






















RP − n2 (RB1 +RB2)
]2 (7.13)
For a significance of 2.5, there is a 98.8% chance that the signal is not due to statistical
fluctuation. This level of significance will be use to determine detection time. The
signal region is selected to be ±2σ of the 10.8 MeV energy signal.
The probability that the signal is due to background is also calculated. Each bin




























where cb is the background count, σb the error in that count, and cs is the error
in that count.
7.3 Results
7.3.1 Detection time with NaI Detectors
The calculation above was computed for an M-107 shell, Mk-12 bomb, and VS-2.2
mine model on a dirt road at 1, 15, 30, 45, and 60 cm and 15, 30, 45, and 60 cm for
a concrete road surface. As can be seen from tables 7.1 and 7.2, detection times vary
from 5 minutes to times well beyond practical detection times. Detection for most
devices is possible up to roughly 30 cm, however beyond that the signal falls below
practical detection levels.
Surprisingly, this is not due primarily to the concentration of silicon in the soil and
road surface. It can be seen from Fig. 7.2 that the counts with no explosive present
are small in the signal region relative to the counts that result from the explosive
presence, even in the 30 cm case of the Mk-12 bomb. Instead, the primary difficult in
detecting the explosive arises not from the 29Si background, but rather the first escape
peak of nitrogen from the explosive itself. The nitrogen first escape peak occurs at
10.3 MeV, that for silicon at 10.6 MeV, and that for the primary photopeak at 10.8
MeV, placing the silicon background nearly in the middle of the primary and first
escape peak of nitrogen. The resulting effect is to fill in additional counts between the
primary and first escape peaks of nitrogen, making both peaks indistinct, resulting
in the difficulty of detecting the peak in NaI, due to its poor resolution.
This can be seen in Fig. 7.1. Both the 10.8 MeV primary photopeak of nitrogen
and its first escape peak at 10.3 MeV decrease in strength in the presence of the
concrete road surface. This is likely a result of capture on the additional hydrogen
100
Figure 7.1. Differences in sodium iodide spectra for concrete and dirt
roads
in concrete compared to average soil. The resulting additional 10.6 MeV gamma
rays also increase, the result being that the two nitrogen peaks are suppressed while
the background between them is increased, resulting in two peaks which are far less
distinct than without the concrete, causing the difficulty in detecting explosive in the
presence of concrete. Because of this effect, the probability that the counts in the
region as calculated by Eq. 7.2 is essentially zero for all tested cases, yet detection
time is excessive.
The difficulty caused is due directly to the poor energy resolution of the NaI de-
tectors. If microphonics, cooling requirement, and additional cost of HPGe detectors
can be ignored, they provide far superior performance to that of NaI, as the primary
and first escape peaks of nitrogen and the 10.6 MeV silicon line are all fully resolved.
7.3.2 Detection time with HPGe Detectors
To estimate the detection time with HPGe, a similar procedure to that followed
for NaI was followed. While the resolution of NaI is 390 keV at 10 MeV, that for
HPGe is 20 keV at the same energy [55], a considerable improvement.
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Figure 7.2. Sodium iodide signal vs. background
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The simulated detectors’ dimensions are based on the Ortec GEM-F8250P4-PLB-
S. The Gaussian energy broadening constants are given by a = 0.0011265 MeV b =
0.0012670 MeV
1
2 c = 0.00127429 MeV−1 [56]. Samples of the detector’s response
were taken centered on the face of the detector, and then at radii of 1.36 and 2.71
cm, dividing the face of the detector roughly by thirds.
The maximum count rate for this system is primarily limited by the fall time of
the preamplifier. Ortec, a major producer of HPGe detectors, indicates their preamps
to have an energy rate limit of 145,000 MeV/sec [57]. The weight average energy in
the worst case scenario from the spectra obtained from simulation is 835 keV, yielding
a maximum rate of 173,000 cps. To ensure limited dead time, a rate of 40,000 cps
was selected for the computation of detection time.
The resulting improved energy resolution completely resolves the 14N primary and
first escape peaks and the 29Si peak, as shown in Fig. 7.3. The result is a substantial
improvement detection time as a result, especially in the concrete road case. This
is particularly obvious when the spectrum for HPGe and that for NaI is compared,
as shown in Fig. 7.4. The resulting nitrogen peak, despite the significant burial
depth, is still plainly visible and resolved from the silicon background, resulting in
far superior detection time. Again, the counts under this peak are significantly above
the background count obtained from a soil cube with no explosive present, resulting
in essentially zero probability of a detection resulting from background as computed
by Eq. 7.2.
7.4 Possible Improvements
The excess signal detection times are owed largely to the low energy resolution of
the detectors. As a result, it is likely preferred to switch to a higher energy resolution
detectors. While HPGe may be difficult to implement given the constraints regarding
noise generated by microphonics, the poor count rate, the poor efficiency, as well as
the requirement that these detectors remain at liquid nitrogen temperatures, they
103
Figure 7.3. Differences in HPGe spectra for concrete and dirt roads
Figure 7.4. Comparison of spectra for NaI and HPGe for a Mk-12 bomb
at 60 cm depth
104






















Detection times for various devices on a dirt road
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Detection times for various devices on a concrete road
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would provide considerable improvement in the detection time if feasible, considering
the resolution is 20 keV at 10 MeV [55], a considerable improvement over the 390
keV of NaI. The resulting improved energy resolution would completely resolve the
14N and 29Si peaks, reducing detection time by one to two orders of magnitude.
Another possibility would be the substitution of scintillators based on lanthanum
halides, especially LaBr and LaCl. These scintillators do not require cooling and have
superior characteristics compared to NaI. LaBr has a superior light decay constant
of 16 ns and LaCl 28 ns, compared to 250 ns for NaI, which will allow higher count
rates than those available with NaI detectors. The light yield is also superior, with
63,000 photons/MeV released for LaBr and 49,000 photons/MeV for LaCl, compared
to 38,000 photons/MeV for NaI. This superior light yield should also increase energy
resolution of the detectors. While the densities of NaI and LaCl are comparable,
that of LaBr is 5.08 g/cm3, an approximately 40% increase over that of NaI, which
will also increase the efficiency of the detector [41,58]. The only difficulty associated
with these types of detectors is they cost 7 - 17 times as much as NaI detectors and
moreover are less commercially available in larger sizes as a result of their relatively
recent introduction to the market.
APPENDIX
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c Cell cards - origin at center of sphere
c -=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-
1001 301 -0.0012 +2008 -2301 +2004 -2003 +2006 -2005
1002 301 -0.0012 +2301 -2007 +2004 -2003 +2006 -2005
1003 306 -2.26 +2001 -2008 +2004 -2003 +2006 -2005
1011 322 -1.4 +2201 -2001 +2002 +2004 -2003 +2006 -2005
1012 322 -1.4 -2201 +2004 -2202
1013 322 -1.4 -2201 +2203 -2003
1021 303 -1.82 -2101 +2102 -2103
1031 320 -7.85 +2101 -2201 +2202 -2203
1032 320 -7.85 -2101 +2202 -2102






















2101 C/X 0 -39.017 7.747
2102 PX -30.2641
2103 PX +30.2641



































c Explosives Detection and Identification by PGNAA
c by EH Seabury and AJ Caffrey














c Neutron Scattering in Concrete and Wood
c A Facure, A X Silvia, C Falcao, and V R Crispim
c Radiation Protection Dosimetry 119 (2006) pp 514-517


















c 10% water moist sand
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c World average soil
c Source:
c Basic Considerations for Monte Carlo Calculations in Soil
c Applied Radiation and Isotopes 62 (2005) 97-107
c Typical density = 1.2 - 1.6 g/cc
























































c From ASTM spec sheet
















c Typical Western US Earth
c From PNNL 15870 Rev 1










c World Average soil, 10 percent moisture
































































imp:n 1 9r 0
imp:p 1 9r 0
sdef pos=0 0 20.16 erg=14






E021 3e-8 118i 12 T
T021 1000 2000 T
F031:P 2301
E031 3e-8 118i 12 T
T031 1000 3000 T
F041:P 2301
E041 3e-8 118i 12 T
T041 1000 4000 T
F051:P 2301
117
E051 3e-8 118i 12 T
T051 1000 5000 T
F061:P 2301
E061 3e-8 118i 12 T
T061 1000 6000 T
F071:P 2301
E071 3e-8 118i 12 T
T071 1000 7000 T
F081:P 2301
E081 3e-8 118i 12 T
T081 1000 8000 T
F091:P 2301
E091 3e-8 118i 12 T
T091 1000 9000 T
F101:P 2301
E101 3e-8 118i 12 T
T101 1000 10000 T
F111:P 2301
E111 3e-8 118i 12 T
T111 1000 11000 T
F121:P 2301
E121 3e-8 118i 12 T
T121 1000 12000 T
F131:P 2301
E131 3e-8 118i 12 T
T131 1000 13000 T
F141:P 2301
E141 3e-8 118i 12 T
T141 1000 14000 T
118
F151:P 2301
E151 3e-8 118i 12 T
T151 1000 15000 T
F161:P 2301
E161 3e-8 118i 12 T
T161 1000 16000 T
F171:P 2301
E171 3e-8 118i 12 T
T171 1000 17000 T
F181:P 2301
E181 3e-8 118i 12 T
T181 1000 18000 T
F191:P 2301
E191 3e-8 118i 12 T
T191 1000 19000 T
F201:P 2301
E201 3e-8 118i 12 T
T201 1000 20000 T
c -=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-





c Cell cards - origin at center of sphere
c -=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-
1101 324 -1.00 +2002 -2003 +2005 -2006 +2007 -2008
119
1102 0 +2001 -2002 +2005 -2006 +2007 -2008













































c Explosives Detection and Identification by PGNAA
c by EH Seabury and AJ Caffrey














c Neutron Scattering in Concrete and Wood
c A Facure, A X Silvia, C Falcao, and V R Crispim
c Radiation Protection Dosimetry 119 (2006) pp 514-517


















c 10% water moist sand







c World average soil
c Source:
c Basic Considerations for Monte Carlo Calculations in Soil
c Applied Radiation and Isotopes 62 (2005) 97-107
c Typical density = 1.2 - 1.6 g/cc
























































c From ASTM spec sheet
















c Typical Western US Earth
c From PNNL 15870 Rev 1










c World Average soil, 10 percent moisture
























































c Boron Carbide - B4C










c Density: 1.00 g/cc



















imp:n 1 1 1 0
imp:p 1 1 1 0
sdef pos=0 0 -0.5 erg=14






E101 3e-8 118i 12 T
T101 1500 10000 T
F201:N 2003
E201 3e-8 118i 14 T
F301:N 2002
E301 3e-8 118i 14 T
c -=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-
c End of Input Deck
c -=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-
A.3 Signal Calcuation
M107 Shell signal run
c -=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-
c Cell cards - origin at center of sphere
c -=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-
1101 319 -1.4 +2302 +2001 -2007 +2003 -2004 +2005 -2006
1102 319 -1.4 -2302 +2005 -2305
1103 319 -1.4 -2302 +2306 -2006
129
1201 320 -7.85 -2302 +2305 -2303
1202 320 -7.85 -2302 +2304 -2306
1203 320 -7.85 +2301 -2302 +2303 -2304
1204 303 -1.82 -2301 +2303 -2304
1301 301 -0.0012 +2007 -2125 +2003 -2004 +2005 -2006
1302 301 -0.0012 +2125 -2126 +2003 -2111 +2005 -2006
1303 301 -0.0012 +2125 -2126 +2111 -2112 +2005 -2123
1304 301 -0.0012 +2125 -2126 +2111 -2112 +2124 -2006
1305 301 -0.0012 +2125 -2126 +2112 -2004 +2005 -2006
1306 301 -0.0012 +2126 -2002 +2003 -2004 +2005 -2006
1307 323 -2.52 +2125 -2201 +2111 -2112 +2123 -2124
1411 324 -3.67 +2128 -2127 +2109 -2107 +2120 -2122
1412 324 -3.67 +2128 -2127 +2105 -2103 +2120 -2122
1413 324 -3.67 +2128 -2127 +2101 -2102 +2120 -2122
1414 324 -3.67 +2128 -2127 +2104 -2106 +2120 -2122
1415 324 -3.67 +2128 -2127 +2108 -2110 +2120 -2122
1421 324 -3.67 +2128 -2127 +2109 -2107 +2116 -2118
1422 324 -3.67 +2128 -2127 +2105 -2103 +2116 -2118
1423 324 -3.67 +2128 -2127 +2101 -2102 +2116 -2118
1424 324 -3.67 +2128 -2127 +2104 -2106 +2116 -2118
1425 324 -3.67 +2128 -2127 +2108 -2110 +2116 -2118
1431 324 -3.67 +2128 -2127 +2109 -2107 +2113 -2114
1432 324 -3.67 +2128 -2127 +2105 -2103 +2113 -2114
1433 324 -3.67 +2128 -2127 +2101 -2102 +2113 -2114
1434 324 -3.67 +2128 -2127 +2104 -2106 +2113 -2114
1435 324 -3.67 +2128 -2127 +2108 -2110 +2113 -2114
1441 324 -3.67 +2128 -2127 +2109 -2107 +2117 -2115
1442 324 -3.67 +2128 -2127 +2105 -2103 +2117 -2115
1443 324 -3.67 +2128 -2127 +2101 -2102 +2117 -2115
130
1444 324 -3.67 +2128 -2127 +2104 -2106 +2117 -2115
1445 324 -3.67 +2128 -2127 +2108 -2110 +2117 -2115
1451 324 -3.67 +2128 -2127 +2109 -2107 +2121 -2119
1452 324 -3.67 +2128 -2127 +2105 -2103 +2121 -2119
1453 324 -3.67 +2128 -2127 +2101 -2102 +2121 -2119
1454 324 -3.67 +2128 -2127 +2104 -2106 +2121 -2119
1455 324 -3.67 +2128 -2127 +2108 -2110 +2121 -2119
1501 325 -2.7 +2128 -2127 +2111 -2109 +2123 -2124
1502 325 -2.7 +2128 -2127 +2123 -2121 +2109 -2110
1503 325 -2.7 +2128 -2127 +2123 -2124 +2110 -2112
1504 325 -2.7 +2128 -2127 +2122 -2124 +2109 -2110
1505 325 -2.7 +2128 -2127 +2107 -2105 +2121 -2122
1506 325 -2.7 +2128 -2127 +2103 -2101 +2121 -2122
1507 325 -2.7 +2128 -2127 +2102 -2104 +2121 -2122
1508 325 -2.7 +2128 -2127 +2106 -2108 +2121 -2122
1511 325 -2.7 +2128 -2127 +2109 -2107 +2118 -2120
1512 325 -2.7 +2128 -2127 +2105 -2103 +2118 -2120
1513 325 -2.7 +2128 -2127 +2101 -2102 +2118 -2120
1514 325 -2.7 +2128 -2127 +2104 -2106 +2118 -2120
1515 325 -2.7 +2128 -2127 +2108 -2110 +2118 -2120
1521 325 -2.7 +2128 -2127 +2109 -2107 +2114 -2116
1522 325 -2.7 +2128 -2127 +2105 -2103 +2114 -2116
1523 325 -2.7 +2128 -2127 +2101 -2102 +2114 -2116
1524 325 -2.7 +2128 -2127 +2104 -2106 +2114 -2116
1525 325 -2.7 +2128 -2127 +2108 -2110 +2114 -2116
1531 325 -2.7 +2128 -2127 +2109 -2107 +2115 -2113
1532 325 -2.7 +2128 -2127 +2105 -2103 +2115 -2113
1533 325 -2.7 +2128 -2127 +2101 -2102 +2115 -2113
1534 325 -2.7 +2128 -2127 +2104 -2106 +2115 -2113
131
1535 325 -2.7 +2128 -2127 +2108 -2110 +2115 -2113
1541 325 -2.7 +2128 -2127 +2109 -2107 +2119 -2117
1542 325 -2.7 +2128 -2127 +2105 -2103 +2119 -2117
1543 325 -2.7 +2128 -2127 +2101 -2102 +2119 -2117
1544 325 -2.7 +2128 -2127 +2104 -2106 +2119 -2117
1545 325 -2.7 +2128 -2127 +2108 -2110 +2119 -2117
1591 325 -2.7 +2201 -2128 +2111 -2112 +2123 -2124










































2301 C/Y 0 -40.017 7.747






































c Explosives Detection and Identification by PGNAA
c by EH Seabury and AJ Caffrey













c Neutron Scattering in Concrete and Wood
c A Facure, A X Silvia, C Falcao, and V R Crispim
c Radiation Protection Dosimetry 119 (2006) pp 514-517



















c 10% water moist sand






c World average soil
c Source:
c Basic Considerations for Monte Carlo Calculations in Soil
c Applied Radiation and Isotopes 62 (2005) 97-107
c Typical density = 1.2 - 1.6 g/cc
























































c From ASTM spec sheet

















c Typical Western US Earth
c From PNNL 15870 Rev 1









c World Average soil, 10 percent moisture
























































c Boron Carbide - B4C





























imp:p 1 68r 0
imp:n 1 68r 0
sdef pos=0 0 0.5 erg=14.1






E118 0 254i 12
FC118 Gaussian broadened spectrum on detector 11
FT118 GEB -0.00789 0.06769 0.21159
F668:P 1411
FC668 Unbroadened spectrum on detector 11
E668 0 254i 12
F128:P 1412
E128 0 254i 12
FC128 Gaussian broadened spectrum on detector 12
142
FT128 GEB -0.00789 0.06769 0.21159
F678:P 1412
FC678 Unbroadened spectrum on detector 12
E678 0 254i 12
F138:P 1413
E138 0 254i 12
FC138 Gaussian broadened spectrum on detector 13
FT138 GEB -0.00789 0.06769 0.21159
F688:P 1413
FC688 Unbroadened spectrum on detector 13
E688 0 254i 12
F148:P 1414
E148 0 254i 12
FC148 Gaussian broadened spectrum on detector 14
FT148 GEB -0.00789 0.06769 0.21159
F698:P 1414
FC698 Unbroadened spectrum on detector 14
E698 0 254i 12
F158:P 1415
E158 0 254i 12
FC158 Gaussian broadened spectrum on detector 15
FT158 GEB -0.00789 0.06769 0.21159
F608:P 1415
FC608 Unbroadened spectrum on detector 15
E608 0 254i 12
F218:P 1421
E218 0 254i 12
FC218 Gaussian broadened spectrum on detector 21
FT218 GEB -0.00789 0.06769 0.21159
143
F768:P 1421
FC768 Unbroadened spectrum on detector 21
E768 0 254i 12
F228:P 1422
E228 0 254i 12
FC228 Gaussian broadened spectrum on detector 22
FT228 GEB -0.00789 0.06769 0.21159
F778:P 1422
FC778 Unbroadened spectrum on detector 22
E778 0 254i 12
F238:P 1423
E238 0 254i 12
FC238 Gaussian broadened spectrum on detector 23
FT238 GEB -0.00789 0.06769 0.21159
F788:P 1423
FC788 Unbroadened spectrum on detector 23
E788 0 254i 12
F248:P 1424
E248 0 254i 12
FC248 Gaussian broadened spectrum on detector 24
FT248 GEB -0.00789 0.06769 0.21159
F798:P 1424
FC798 Unbroadened spectrum on detector 24
E798 0 254i 12
F258:P 1425
E258 0 254i 12
FC258 Gaussian broadened spectrum on detector 25
FT258 GEB -0.00789 0.06769 0.21159
F708:P 1425
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FC708 Unbroadened spectrum on detector 25
E708 0 254i 12
F318:P 1431
E318 0 254i 12
FC318 Gaussian broadened spectrum on detector 31
FT318 GEB -0.00789 0.06769 0.21159
F868:P 1431
FC868 Unbroadened spectrum on detector 31
E868 0 254i 12
F328:P 1432
E328 0 254i 12
FC328 Gaussian broadened spectrum on detector 32
FT328 GEB -0.00789 0.06769 0.21159
F878:P 1432
FC878 Unbroadened spectrum on detector 32
E878 0 254i 12
F338:P 1433
E338 0 254i 12
FC338 Gaussian broadened spectrum on detector 33
FT338 GEB -0.00789 0.06769 0.21159
F888:P 1433
FC888 Unbroadened spectrum on detector 33
E888 0 254i 12
F348:P 1434
E348 0 254i 12
FC348 Gaussian broadened spectrum on detector 34
FT348 GEB -0.00789 0.06769 0.21159
F898:P 1434
FC898 Unbroadened spectrum on detector 34
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E898 0 254i 12
F358:P 1435
E358 0 254i 12
FC358 Gaussian broadened spectrum on detector 35
FT358 GEB -0.00789 0.06769 0.21159
F808:P 1435
FC808 Unbroadened spectrum on detector 35
E808 0 254i 12
F418:P 1441
E418 0 254i 12
FC418 Gaussian broadened spectrum on detector 41
FT418 GEB -0.00789 0.06769 0.21159
F968:P 1441
FC968 Unbroadened spectrum on detector 41
E968 0 254i 12
F428:P 1442
E428 0 254i 12
FC428 Gaussian broadened spectrum on detector 42
FT428 GEB -0.00789 0.06769 0.21159
F978:P 1442
FC978 Unbroadened spectrum on detector 42
E978 0 254i 12
F438:P 1443
E438 0 254i 12
FC438 Gaussian broadened spectrum on detector 43
FT438 GEB -0.00789 0.06769 0.21159
F988:P 1443
FC988 Unbroadened spectrum on detector 43
E988 0 254i 12
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F448:P 1444
E448 0 254i 12
FC448 Gaussian broadened spectrum on detector 44
FT448 GEB -0.00789 0.06769 0.21159
F998:P 1444
FC998 Unbroadened spectrum on detector 44
E998 0 254i 12
F458:P 1445
E458 0 254i 12
FC458 Gaussian broadened spectrum on detector 45
FT458 GEB -0.00789 0.06769 0.21159
F908:P 1445
FC908 Unbroadened spectrum on detector 45
E908 0 254i 12
F518:P 1451
E518 0 254i 12
FC518 Gaussian broadened spectrum on detector 51
FT518 GEB -0.00789 0.06769 0.21159
F068:P 1451
FC068 Unbroadened spectrum on detector 51
E068 0 254i 12
F528:P 1452
E528 0 254i 12
FC528 Gaussian broadened spectrum on detector 52
FT528 GEB -0.00789 0.06769 0.21159
F078:P 1452
FC078 Unbroadened spectrum on detector 52
E078 0 254i 12
F538:P 1453
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E538 0 254i 12
FC538 Gaussian broadened spectrum on detector 53
FT538 GEB -0.00789 0.06769 0.21159
F088:P 1453
FC088 Unbroadened spectrum on detector 53
E088 0 254i 12
F548:P 1454
E548 0 254i 12
FC548 Gaussian broadened spectrum on detector 54
FT548 GEB -0.00789 0.06769 0.21159
F098:P 1454
FC098 Unbroadened spectrum on detector 54
E098 0 254i 12
F558:P 1455
E558 0 254i 12
FC558 Gaussian broadened spectrum on detector 55
FT558 GEB -0.00789 0.06769 0.21159
F008:P 1455
FC008 Unbroadened spectrum on detector 55
E008 0 254i 12
F101:P 2201
FC101 Photon flux in to detector array
E101 0 254i 12
T101 1500 10000 T
C101 0 1
c -=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-






c Cell cards - origin at center of sphere
c -=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-
1001 303 -8.96 +2001 -2002 -2003
1002 303 -8.96 +2004 -2003 +2002 -2005
1003 303 -8.96 +2005 -2006 -2003
1101 0 +2002 -2101 -2004
1102 0 +2101 -2106 +2103 -2004
1103 0 +2106 -2005 -2004
1201 302 -2.6989 +2101 -2102 -2103
1202 302 -2.6989 +2104 -2103 +2102 -2105
1203 302 -2.6989 +2105 -2106 -2103
1301 0 +2203 -2105 -2104
1302 0 +2201 -2203 -2202
1401 304 -5.323 (+2102 -2201 -2104):(+2201 -2203 +2202 -2104)
1501 0 -2003 +2006 -2500
1502 0 -2003 -2001 -2500


























































imp:p 1 14r 0
sdef pos=0 1.358 -0.01 DIR=1 VEC=0 0.8660 0.5000 erg=3.603500






E18 0 254i 12
151
c FT18 GEB -0.00789 0.06769 0.21159
c -=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-
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